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Antitrust economics has the potential to accomplish what are fundamentally
political ends, and the ebbs and flows in antitrust enforcement over the more
than twelve decades since antitrust doctrine was reduced to federal statute
frequently have been justified in economic terms.' The most prominent school
of antitrust economics in the past half-century, the Chicago School, has exper-
ienced its share of criticism for advancing neutral-seeming policies for politi-
cal ends.2 Whether the criticism is warranted, it is clear that the Chicago
School's reductionist enforcement philosophy has acquired tremendous sway
over public opinion, legislators, enforcers, and, most notably, courts.3
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I See Darren Bush, Too Big to Bail: The Role of Antitrust in Distressed Industries, 77 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 277, 281-96 (2010) [hereinafter Too Big to Bail] (describing the progression of anti-
trust economics through the 20th century).
2 See id. at 291-96.
3 See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago School of Antitrust: The
2006 Term and Beyond, COMPETITION PoL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2007, at 25, 25 [hereinafter The
Roberts Court and the Chicago School]. Although debates rage over the actual source of theories
underlying modem legal rules, Chicago's non-interventionist posture certainly deserves some
credit for laissez-faire attitudes reflected in legislation, such as the Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (see Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 Hous. L. REV. 285 (2007)); reduced federal en-
forcement both at the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission beginning in
1981 (see Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911,
1912 (2009)) [hereinafter Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago] (reviewing How CHICAGO
OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFacT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST
POLICY (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) [hereinafter How CHICAGO OVERSHOT THE MARK]); and
eighteen years of pro-defendant results in Supreme Court antitrust decisions, bookended by East-
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The lesson of the power of economic arguments to achieve political ends
has not been lost on members of the antitrust community seeking an alterna-
tive to the Chicago School. The Post-Chicago response in the 1980s and
1990s reflected both an academic debate over the robustness of the theories
advanced by Chicago School thinkers and an effort to regain the enforcement
ground that had been lost in the courts and in the agencies. The difference in
the antitrust debate since Chicago is not that it has become more or less politi-
cally charged than it was before the 1970s. 4 The difference is that this quintes-
sentially political debate has in recent decades been conducted almost
exclusively in economic terms.'
Behavioral Antitrust is a new area of scholarly inquiry that has garnered
some attention in very recent years.6 The earliest article explicitly proposing a
behavioral approach to antitrust was written in 2002.1 Proponents encourage
courts and policymakers to import the study of behavioral law and economics
into antitrust analysis, using empirical study better to understand the conduct
of individuals in market settings. Like foregoing antitrust economics move-
ments, Behavioral Antitrust is on its face result-neutral, but as it has been
discussed to date, it has a political slant. Until very recently, all of the writing
advocating Behavioral Antitrust favored increased antitrust enforcement. FTC
Commissioner Thomas Rosch has characterized the views of detractors as be-
ing that behavioral economics is "liberalism masquerading as economic
thinking."'
Neo-Chicago Antitrust is the topic of this Symposium. Its adherents charac-
terize it as a return to Chicago principles, informed by the developments in
economic thinking over the past thirty-or-so years-notably, insights from
man Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), and American Needle,
Inc. v. National Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
4 The Chicago School gained ascendency in the late 1970s with the publication of Richard
Posner's Antitrust Law (1976), Robert Bork's The Antitrust Paradox (1978), and several Su-
preme Court decisions in 1977, though the school has its roots in earlier work. See generally
Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 925-26
(1979) [hereinafter Chicago School Analysis].
5 See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051
(1979) [hereinafter Political Content] ("There probably has never been a period comparable to
the last decade, however, when antitrust economists and lawyers have had such success in per-
suading the courts to adopt an exclusively economic approach to antitrust questions."); see also
Bush, Too Big to Bail, supra note 1, at 283-96 (discussing pre-Chicago attention to non-eco-
nomic goals and the failure of the Post-Chicago School to refocus on such goals).
6 See generally Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J.
1527 (2011) [hereinafter Behavioral Antitrust] (canvassing the literature).
7 See Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal
Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482 (2002) [hereinafter The Fable of Entry].
8 J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Behavioral Economics: Observations Re-
garding Issues that Lie Ahead, Remarks Before the Vienna Competition Conference 12 (June 9,
2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100609viennaremarks.pdf.
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both the Chicago and Post-Chicago schools.' Its most visible contribution is a
formal adoption of the error-cost framework from then-Professor Easter-
brook's influential 1984 article, The Limits of Antitrust.'0 The error-cost
framework is viewed by many as a politically charged rule of decision, which
almost always includes a deregulatory preference for false negative error
(equating to less enforcement than the optimal level) over false positive error
(equating to an excess of enforcement)."
But there is more to Neo-Chicago than the mere formal adoption of the
error-cost framework. Daniel Crane has criticized both the Chicago School
and the leading reaction, Post-Chicago, for their disinclination to engage seri-
ously in empirical work.'2 Crane argues that Neo-Chicago antitrust can suc-
ceed, in part, by "providing empirical support for Chicago School theories." 3
David Evans and Jorge Padilla's 2005 foundational article on Neo-Chicago
concludes with the suggestion that empirical study would be a welcome con-
tribution to a literature on Neo-Chicago antitrust.14 If devotion to empirical
study is seen as a fundamental part of Neo-Chicago, it is consistent with,
rather than hostile to, Behavioral Antitrust.
Neo-Chicago and Behavioral Antitrust came along at about the same time,
and a marriage of the two might temper any respective tendencies of either
toward predetermined political ends. The combination might produce a more
result-neutral enterprise of "economically informed antitrust." Neo-Chicago
promises an improvement over Chicago's simplification of facts in pursuit of
9 See David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral
Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 74-75 (2005) [hereinafter A Neo-
Chicago Approach].
t0 Frank H. Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Limits]; see Thomas A. Lam-
bert & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust (Over-?) Confidence, 20 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 219,
225-26 (2008) [hereinafter (Over?) Confidence] (error-cost framework is the basis of responsi-
ble enforcement policy). Many who do not formally associate themselves with Neo-Chicago
regularly employ the error-cost framework in antitrust analysis. See, e.g., Mark Anderson & Max
Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y I (2010); Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of
Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (2005); Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger
Analysis and the Treatment of Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better?, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 537
(2007).
1 The justification for this preference is that firms, once stung by regulatory interference, are
unlikely to return to what may be efficient conduct. Easterbrook, Limits, supra note 10, at 15;
Evans & Padilla, A Neo-Chicago Approach, supra note 9, at 84 ("[M]arket forces play little
corrective role for procompetitive business practices deemed anticompetitive.").
12 Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, supra note 3, at 193 1. Not all agree. See
Joshua Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School's Influence on
Antitrust, COMPETITION Po.'Y INT'L, Spring 2009, at 1, 10-11 [hereinafter Overshot the Mark?]
(noting "the centrality of empiricism to the research agenda of Chicago antitrust analysis") (re-
viewing How CHICAGo OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 3).
13 Crane, supra note 3, at 1929.
14 Evans & Padilla, A Neo-Chicago Approach, supra note 9, at 98.
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tractability, which Chicago's advocates applaud but critics argue has gone so
far as to produce false understandings of marketplace conduct and effects."
That suggests adherents might be receptive to efforts of Behavioral Antitrust
scholars in critiquing antitrust rules in the light of empirical studies of individ-
ual economic actors. Behavioral Antitrust, in turn, has the goal of informing
the assumptions underlying established economic theory through empirical
study of the behavior of individual economic actors. That goal might be ad-
vanced by looking to Neo-Chicago's combination of theories from the Chi-
cago and Post-Chicago Schools for a comprehensive theoretical framework
for analysis.
I suggest here a possible synthesis of Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Anti-
trust into an enterprise of "economically informed antitrust." Because Neo-
Chicago is at bottom about overcoming the shortcomings of Chicago School
antitrust, which built theories on deliberately simplified assumptions, Behav-
ioral Antitrust naturally complements the theoretical framework by providing
an understanding of the realities of individual market actors. 6 This article thus
proposes that Behavioral Antitrust informs intuitions about the conduct of in-
dividual economic actors. When incorporated into a developed theoretical
framework those intuitions may support results that theory would otherwise
reject. I apply my arguments specifically to the leading Post-Chicago author-
ity, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.," and suggest that
lessons from empirical study support the result in a way some have argued
theory does not.
I. A BRIEF TAXONOMY OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
Serious debate ended long ago whether U.S. antitrust policy should be in-
formed by economics-scholars of otherwise massively divergent views ap-
pear to agree on that proposition.'" There is also broad agreement that the
5 For a Chicago advocate, see Posner, Chicago School Analysis, supra note 4, at 931 (con-
trasting the Chicago School with the Harvard School by reference to the latter's rejection of
simplifying assumptions "in favor of microscopic examination of the idiosyncrasies of particular
markets"). For criticisms, see, for example, Thomas E. Kauper, Influence of Conservative Eco-
nomic Analysis on the Development of the Law of Antitrust, in How CHICAGO OVERSHOT THE
MARK, supra note 3, at 42 (oversimplification is a "familiar" criticism of Chicago).
16 Cf. Evans & Padilla, A Neo-Chicago Approach, supra note 9, at 75 (error costs should be
analyzed in the light of "current economic knowledge and experience").
1 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
I8 See ROBERT A. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter PARADOX];
Pitofsky, Political Content, supra note 5; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST EN-
TERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 10 (2005) [hereinafter ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE] ("Antitrust
is an economic, not a moral, enterprise."). Some argue that non-economic considerations should
be part of antitrust policy. See, e.g., Bush, Too Big to Bail, supra note 1, at 281-85; Maurice E.
Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a Better Competition Policy for the Media: The Challenge of
Developing Antitrust Policies that Support the Media Sector's Unique Role in Our Democracy,
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purpose of antitrust is to protect consumers.19 The modem debate in antitrust
economics centers on how economics is best deployed to accomplish that
purpose.
A. THE LAST FOUR DECADES
In a genre of antitrust scholarship perhaps traceable to then-Professor Rich-
ard Posner's article, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,2 0 scholars have
analyzed the changing nature of antitrust economics over decades of enforce-
ment. Darren Bush's recent article in this Journal detailed the treatments of
firm size across schools of antitrust economics from Brandeis to Behavioral
Antitrust.2 Then-Commissioner William Kovacic's broadly cited Double He-
lix article focused on the Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Harvard Schools with
regard to the development of modem standards for dominant firm conduct.22
Joshua Wright and Einer Elhauge debated in the pages of the journal Competi-
tion Policy International whether the Chicago School or Harvard School has
had a more profound impact on the Supreme Court's recent antitrust
jurisprudence.23
It is a popular exercise to label commentators, enforcers, and judges as
adherents to one or another school of thought. Like political party affiliations,
brands given to a particular ideology operate as shorthand for a line of think-
ing that may, or may not, be cohesive. It is more convenient to apply the label
than it is formally to adopt all the arguments that the label encompasses. This
labeling may create a tendency to accept wholesale or to reject wholesale a
type of antitrust analysis because one thinker is associated with that brand, or
to accept or to reject the views of a thinker because of the brand with which
she or he is associated.2 4 It threatens stagnation of thought as adherents to one
ideology reject good ideas from another.
42 CONN. L. REV. 103, 103 (2009) (noting the media-specific non-economic concern regarding
public access to varied sources of information and viewpoints).
19 See Max Huffman, Bridging the Divide? Theories for Integrating Competition Law and
Consumer Protection, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 7, 7 (2010) [hereinafter Bridging the Divide].
20 Posner, Chicago School Analysis, supra note 4.
21 Bush, Too Big to Bail, supra note 1, at 281-96.
22 William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant
Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. I [hereinafter
Intellectual DNA].
23 See Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago School, supra note 3, at 25, 39-54; Einer
Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions?, COMPETITION PoL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2007, at 59.
24 Labels sometimes seem to proliferate like submarkets, and perhaps as unjustifiably. It is
unclear, for example, whether Justice Breyer would consider himself a "New-Harvard Schooler,"
but he recently has been so labeled. See Lambert & Wright, (Over?) Confidence, supra note 10,
at 221.
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Further, labels can obscure the extent to which individual adherents to a
school can deviate from that school's orthodoxy (as Richard Posner some-
times deviates from Chicago "orthodoxy"),25 or to which the views of impor-
tant antitrust thinker like Donald Turner evolve over time. 26 Also, well-
informed commentators may adopt their own shorthand that deviates from
accepted definitions of the schools of antitrust thought. Alan Devlin and
Michael Jacobs recently defined "Chicago" to include "Chicago and post-Chi-
cago"-an approach that threatens to give purists of either school fits, but is
readily defensible in light of both schools' reliance on price theory and recog-
nition of the centrality of economic efficiency. 27 Neo-Chicago, the topic of
this Symposium, has yet to acquire epithet status and thus seems to be easier
to define. Behavioral Antitrust may be the most charged and least well under-
stood. For some, it is a seven-syllable epithet meaning liberal antitrust. For
others, it may be a panacea for decades of under-enforcement. 28
It is equally hard to define the ideologies in relation to one another.
Hovenkamp has described a loose continuum with the Chicago School at one
end and the Harvard-labeled Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm at the
other, with Post-Chicago, Neo-Harvard, and now Neo-Chicago lying in some
order of intervention-mindedness between them. 29 (Behavioral Antitrust, to
those who fear it, might lie somewhere outside of that range.) FTC Commis-
sioner William Kovacic has described the relationship among antitrust ideolo-
gies with regard to dominant firm conduct as a double helix, a more nuanced
25 Though Posner's name is synonymous to some with "conservative"-i.e., non-intervention-
ist-antitrust, that understanding elides the realities of his views on predatory pricing (more
interventionist than the modern rule) and oligopoly conduct (more interventionist than the mod-
ern rule, which was established in 1954 and survived the Warren Court). Predatory pricing:
Compare Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 & n.L,
224 (1992) (holding that prices must be below some appropriate "measure of cost," and citing
Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975) (proposing a below-average-variable-cost rule)),
with RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 217-19 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW]
(criticizing the below-average-variable-cost rule as under-enforcing). Oligopoly conduct: Com-
pare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding interdependent pricing does not
satisfy the agreement element of Section 1), with Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust
Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1562 (1969) [hereinafter Oligopoly] (in-
terdependent pricing is synonymous with agreement and can be challenged under Sherman Act
Section 1).
26 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust
Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 618 (2010) [hereinafter Transaction Cost Economics].
27 Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Economics, 104 Nw.
U. L. REV. 253, 266 (2010).
28 Cf J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the NERA 2010 Antitrust
& Trade Regulation Seminar: The Next Challenges for Antitrust Economists 17 (July 8, 2010),
available at http://ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100708neraspeech.pdf (noting and responding to the
belief that Behavioral Antitrust necessarily favored interventionist regulation).
29 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, supra this issue, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 67 (2012) [hereinafter Costs of Movement].
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assessment.3 0 He sees a spiraling of economic thinking, presumably oriented
upward, which gathers elements from different ideologies as it climbs.
Kovacic's double helix is ecumenical in nature: if Neo-Chicago or Behavioral
Antitrust has valuable insights, those should be drawn into the helix as well.
1. Chicago
There appears to be a loose consensus that Chicago School antitrust flows
from the work of Judges Bork, Posner, and Easterbrook.31 Adopting that con-
sensus view, I note that it is difficult to articulate a unitary philosophy that
describes those thinkers' views. Certainly all three share preferences for eco-
nomic goals over other justifications for antitrust enforcement, for simplicity
over complexity in economic analysis, and for less antitrust intervention than
was favored in the decades before they made their primary contributions.32
But there are areas of profound non-uniformity as well.33
2. Post-Chicago
If Chicagoans are Catholics, Post-Chicagoans are Lutherans. This ideology
represents a reaction to excesses of under-enforcement, primarily due to sim-
plifying assumptions that, while intended to make economics easier to apply,
30 See Kovacic, Intellectual DNA, supra note 22; cf Kauper, supra note 15, at 42 (modem
dominant ideology is "a collective" of Chicago, Harvard, and others "whose views are not easily
pigeonholed").
3' See Andrew I. Gavil, A First Look at the Powell Papers: Sylvania and the Process of
Change in the Supreme Court, ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 8, 11 (discussing Bork and Posner);
Kovacic, Intellectual DNA, supra note 22, at 34 (discussing Bork, Posner, and Easterbrook);
Robert Pitofsky, Introduction, in How CHICAGo OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 3, at 3, 4
(discussing Bork and Posner). The intellectual underpinnings of the Chicago School are of
course both deeper and broader than simply the work of those three. See generally Spencer
Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDOzo L. REV. 367, 379-81 (2009) [herein-
after Virus].
32 See BORK, PARADOX, supra note 18, at 7, 405-07; POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 25,
at 2; Easterbrook, Limits, supra note 10, at 15-16.
33 These include disagreement on the appropriate treatment of unilateral predatory conduct
(compare BORK, PARADOX, supra note 18, at 144-55 (discussion of predatory pricing theory
concluding "attempts to outlaw it are likely to harm consumers more than would abandoning the
effort"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 337 (1981) ("The antitrust offense of predation should be forgotten."), with POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW, supra note 25, at 211 (proposing a theory under which predation is rational and may
explain pricing strategies by Standard Oil prior to 1911)); and vertical agreements (compare
Easterbrook, Limits, supra note 10, at 13-14 (expressing doubt that legal remedies are appropri-
ate for reductions in intrabrand competition); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and
the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 135 (1984) ("No practice a manufacturer uses to
distribute its products should be a subject of serious antitrust attention."), with POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW, supra note 25, at 172 ("Economics suggests several reasons why manufacturers
nonetheless often restrict competition in the distribution of their goods when the law permit them
to do so.")). Posner's economic realities approach to oligopoly conduct, favoring more interven-
tion, appears to be unique among the three. See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 24; see
also supra note 25.
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also bring about wrong results. Bruce Abramson defines Post-Chicago anti-
trust generally as "advocat[ing] delving into case-specific facts and then refin-
ing theories as necessary."3 4 That definition captures well the view that
various simplifying assumptions to which the leading Chicagoans subscribed
produced a false understanding of market realities.3 5 A strong cohort of Post-
Chicagoans would go further and argue that the false understanding of market
realities led to dramatic under-enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Robert Lande's colorfully titled comment, Chicago Takes It on the Chin,
published in this Journal shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in East-
man Kodak Corp. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. ,36 defined the Post-Chi-
cago line of thinking as distinct from the Chicago School based on "the
degree to which information is believed to be imperfect."37 The study of infor-
mation economics, the basis for the 2001 Nobel Prize awarded to George
Akerloff, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz,5 indeed throws a wrench in
the gears of a system built implicitly on the assumption that all market actors
are equally prepared to optimize their choices in bargaining.39
34 Bruce Abramson, Intellectual Property and the Alleged Collapsing of Aftermarkets, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 399, 465 (2007).
35 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 25, at 38.
36 504 U.S. 451 (1992). Kodak is often cited as the leading example of Post-Chicago finding
purchase in the courts. See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 34, at 465.
37 Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Cru-
cial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 193, 193 (1993). In hindsight, Lande was
premature in celebrating the death of the Chicago School, as Kodak was followed by a line of
pro-defendant decisions from the Supreme Court that lasted for seventeen cases over eighteen
years, based on conservative economic, if not technically Chicago School, ideology.
38 See Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (Oct. 10, 2001) (announcing
the recipients of the 2001 Nobel Prize for Economics as Akerloff, Spence, and Stiglitz), http://
nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/2001/press.html; see also George A. Akerloff,
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488
(1970); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. EcoN. 355 (1973); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 283
(1975).
39 It is perhaps surprising that the Chicago School orthodoxy was not better refined with an
appreciation for information asymmetries. Information economics and the theory of the "lemons
equilibrium" that it produced, explaining why low quality products predominate in a market
characterized by asymmetric information, were well established by the late 1970s. See George
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcON. 213 (1961); see also Michael R. Darby
& Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & EcoN. 67 (1973)
(demonstrating the capacity of informed sellers to defeat uninformed purchasers in competitions
for surplus welfare). This reality has been further explored and is well understood. See, e.g.,
JAMES M. LACKO, PRODUCT QUALITY AND INFORMATION IN THE USED CAR MARKET (FTC Bu-
reau of Econ. Staff Report, Apr. 1986) (analyzing information asymmetry and the consequent
"lemons equilibrium"), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/231975.pdf. Posner himself
wrote a monograph discussing the market distortions caused by information asymmetries. RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC (1973) [hereinafter REGULATION].
The Chicago School's ignoring those lessons is evidence of a preference for simplicity over
realism, though Richard Posner's involvement in this conversation may explain his more
nuanced appreciation of ideas like the role of reputation in predation. Lande recognized this,
112 [Vol. 78
2012] MARRYING NEO-CHICAGO WITH BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST
Its detractors have characterized the Post-Chicago reaction as encompass-
ing a series of so-called possibility theorems that challenge Chicago tenets by
showing stylized circumstances in which they do not hold, rather than an-
nouncing its own general theory.40 That criticism is overstated. If a theory
justifies policy prescriptions on the basis of assertions about market phenom-
ena, disproving those assertions by showing even one set of circumstances in
which they fail is a start. Few complain about a vigorous enforcement pro-
gram aimed at price-fixing cartels, although many have argued cartels are
fragile and will disintegrate on their own. 41 And general theories find their
support in individual theorems.42 Indeed, Posner recognized in the introduc-
tion to his 1979 article on the Chicago School that:
[T]he key ideas of the [Chicago] school . . . . did not . .. emerge from a full-
blown philosophy of antitrust. Rather, they were the product of pondering
specific questions raised by antitrust cases, and only in retrospect did it be-
come clear that they constituted the basis of a general theory of the proper
scope of antitrust policy. 43
Reduced to its core, the dominant criticism of Post-Chicago is that it has not
yet produced a sufficiently large set of individual theorems to support a gen-
eral theory." That same criticism is now being leveled at those seeking to
import behavioralist insights into antitrust analysis.
3. Harvard
There is disagreement about who defines the Harvard School, and what the
school stands for is less clear than in the case of Chicago. Kovacic sees its
leading thinkers as being Donald Turner, Phillip Areeda, and Justice (formerly
Professor) Breyer.45 Others refer to a "Neo-Harvard School" as including
arguing that Chicagoans are not naive about the role of imperfect information, but do not spin out
its consequences to their logical conclusions. See Lande, supra note 37, at 193.
40 See Gregory T. Gundlach & Joan M. Phillips, Contributions and Challenges of Marketing
to Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 51, 65 (2003).
41 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 25, at 67-68 & nn.26-27 (explaining the theory
of cartel fragility and citing sources); see also, e.g., Julia Schiller et al., Toward Convergence:
The Volume of "Affected" Commerce Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and "Impact" Anal-
ysis Under the Clayton Act, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 987, 998-99 & nn.98-99 (2011) (citing 2B
PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 405b2, at 29 (3d ed. 2007); id. at 405b; United
States v. Hayter Oil Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1995)).
42 Albert Einstein published his special theory of relativity in 1905. The general theory of
relativity had to wait a decade. See Biography: Albert Einstein, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http:/www.
nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/physics/laureates/192 1/einstein.html.
43 Posner, Chicago School Analysis, supra note 4, at 926.
44 It may be that not every observer accepts the view that Post-Chicago is lacking a theory. See
Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, supra note 3, at 1927 ("[P]ost-Chicago offers
a countermodel that is just as elegant . . . .").
45 Kovacic, Intellectual DNA, supra note 22, at 34.
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Hovenkamp and Breyer.4 6 Casual analysis tends to view Harvard as the intel-
lectual counterweight to Chicago. Posner once described Harvard and Chi-
cago in an essay targeted to non-antitrust-specialists as "warring camps" with
Harvard "prone to find monopolistic practices" and Chicago "believ[ing] the
same practices to be for the most part procompetitive."47 Hovenkamp "over-
simplif[ied]" the comparison thusly: "while the Chicago School emphasized
the ways that firms would continue to compete notwithstanding imperfect
structures, the Harvard School emphasized the ways that firms could avoid
competing." 48 On further reading Hovenkamp shows that this simplified
description relies on an archaic definition of Harvard, what is commonly
called the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, which due to the involve-
ment of thinkers like Donald Turner and Joe Bain frequently has been associ-
ated with Harvard. 49
4. Neo-Chicago
Neo-Chicago is easier to peg, perhaps because it has only recently been
self-defined. Neo-Chicago was first discussed in a 2005 article by Evans and
Padilla proposing an approach to the law of product tying.50 They defined
their approach as improving on the Chicago School theories by incorporating
the error-cost framework drawn from Easterbrook's Limits of Antitrust and
emphasizing empirical study to support the theory 51 Other commentators
have aligned themselves with this camp as well.5 2
46 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Modesty, 105 U. MiCH. L. REV. 1193, 1194 (2007)
(reviewing HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 18).
47 Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Court of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on
Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 781 (1983).
4 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 18, at 35. Consistent with the oversimpli-
fied view, as a law student in the 1990s I was taught that antitrust policy reflected a tension
between Chicago and the "Ivy League."
49 Hovenkamp would draw a distinction between structure-conduct-performance and the mod-
ern Harvard School. Hovenkamp, Costs of Movement, supra note 29, at 74-76; HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 18, at 36-37 (relating the Harvard School's "significant
transformation" in the late 1970s); see also Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and
the Language of Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283, 297 & n.65 (2001) (listing leading
works in the structure-conduct-performance paradigm).
50 See Evans & Padilla, A Neo-Chicago Approach, supra note 9, at 75.
51 Id. at 74-75 (citing Easterbrook, Limits, supra note 10, at 9-14); id. at 80, 98 (criticizing
Post-Chicago for its lack of reliance on data and expressing a need for empirical study of the cost
of errors in enforcement).
52 See Lambert & Wright, (Over?) Confidence, supra note 10, at 225-26. Wright suggests in a
2009 blog post that Neo-Chicago is not new. Joshua Wright, Neo-Chicago Meets Evidence-
Based Antitrust, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (May 12, 2009, 1:37 PM), truthonthemarket.com/2009/
05/12/neo-chicago-meets-evidence-based-antitrust. This position is consistent with Wright's def-
initions elsewhere of Chicago School antitrust as being defined by three features, including "the
centrality of empiricism" and "adoption of the error-cost framework." Wright, Overshot the
Mark?, supra note 12, at 10-12.
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What, at bottom, is Neo-Chicago then doing? Daniel Crane describes Neo-
Chicago as an alternative to Chicago and Post-Chicago ideologies." In his
view Neo-Chicago "accepts Chicago's basic premises as refined by the
emerging body of criticism," and its success will turn on, among other things,
its "providing empirical support for Chicago School theories." 54 In part, he
sees this as a contest between Chicago and Post-Chicago ideologies:
Sooner or later, post-Chicago will have to supply the empirical evidence that
is assumed in, but largely absent from, its attacks on Chicago. For the rea-
sons previously identified, post-Chicago will continue to make only minor
dents in Chicagoan dogma so long as it continues to engage Chicago in a
theoretical tit-for-tat. When post-Chicago begins to put more muscle into
an empirical attack, Chicago will need to respond in kind. 5
Crane's description suggests that the progress of Neo-Chicago will be
through empirical testing of theories from both the Chicago and Post-Chicago
Schools. Theories that cannot be supported empirically will fall by the way-
side, while those that can be will survive. Under this view there is a natural
place for the empirical methods of behavioral economists to be imported into
antitrust law through the burgeoning field of Behavioral Antitrust.
B. BEHAVIORAL EcONOMICS
Behavioral economics is a parallel branch of economic thought that
presents a challenge to neo-classical theories. 6 Combining the study of psy-
chology with economic tools, "behavioralists" have challenged the assump-
tions about individual -conduct that underlie the economic proofs of neo-
classical economics, themselves justifications for legal rules of decision. In
1998 three legal scholars demonstrated that "'real people' differ from homo
economicus" by displaying "three important 'bounds' on human behavior,
bounds that draw into question the central ideas of utility maximization, stable
preferences, rational expectations, and optimal processing of information" un-
derlying neo-classical economics." Behavioral law and economics is the ap-
plication of the principles of behavioral economics to legal analysis. It has
become mainstream over the past ten years."
53 See Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, supra note 3, at 1930-32.
54 Id. at 1931.
5
5 Id.
56 See Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 803, 803 (2008) ("There is little doubt that the major new theoretical approach to law and
economics in the past two decades .. . comes from the adjacent discipline of cognitive psychol-
ogy, which has now morphed into behavioral economics.").
51 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998).
58 The economic theories that underlie the modern behavioral law and economics movement
are decades old. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J.
EcoN. 99 (1955).
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At bottom, behavioral economics is about sequencing the human psycho-
logical genome. When imported into legal analysis, it can assist in guiding the
development of legal rules by recognizing the realities of individual human
behavior, as opposed to an idealized state (which neo-classical economics as-
sumes) that lacks any bounds on rationality, self-interest and willpower. The
intentions of that enterprise are difficult to criticize. We are accustomed to
regulation accounting for real physical traits. Building codes are based on
actual physical proportions, rather than the proportions of some definition of
the ideal human body. Economic regulation is rooted in contracting conduct,
which is a product of psychological, not physical, human characteristics. The
law should likewise account for real psychological traits.
Behavioral economics begins with the unremarkable recognition that, con-
trary to the core assumptions of neo-classical economics, individuals are lim-
ited in their abilities to reason, to resist temptation, and to act in their own
self-interest. Taken together, those bounds render it likely that individuals will
not optimize their own economic self-interest in contracting. That may be
because they are actually incapable of reaching the optimal decision under the
circumstances (bounded rationality), or because they are prevented from
reaching the optimal decision because of a fleeting short-term fancy (bounded
willpower) or an altruistic bent (bounded self-interest). People are known to
rely on "decisionmaking heuristics" to short-cut complex reasoning" and to
act pursuant to "cognitive biases" that favor, among other things, short-term
over long-term benefits and salient over inconspicuous information.w
In their book Nudge, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler offer the example
of retirement savings.6' Rational choice theory suggests that an individual will
calculate how much he or she needs in retirement, save that much, and
thereby optimize present and future savings versus expenditures. Because that
does not happen across a large swath of the populace, we know that some
combination of factors may be at play, such as inability to calculate retirement
needs in advance, disinclination to forgo short-term pleasure for long-term
benefit, and perhaps desire to share their wealth with others. 62
5 Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman labels the heuristic "System I" and the complex reason-
ing "System 2." System I processes occur "automatically and quickly, with little or no effort,"
while System 2 processes "require attention and are disrupted when attention is drawn away."
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20-22 (201 1).
6 See generally Reeves & Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 6, at 1532-38 (discussing
empirically demonstrated cognitive biases and citing authorities).
61 RICHARD H. THALER & CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, ch. 6 (2008).
62 Id. (discussing bounds on rationality and willpower as explanations); see Anuj C. Desai,
Libertarian Paternalism, Externalities, and the "Spirit of Liberty": How Thaler and Sunstein
Are Nudging Us Toward an Overlapping Consensus, 36 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 263, 268 (2011)
(reviewing THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE, supra note 60) (citing THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE,
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Behavioral economics seeks rigorously to explain the deviations from the
theoretical assumptions.63 That process is critically important. A conclusion
that conduct is truly irrational would undermine any efforts at meaningful
policy analysis or the development of generally applicable rules of law tai-
lored to that conduct. One might conclude instead that a legal rule designed
with one instance of conduct in mind will be misguided when applied to any
other instance of conduct." And tailoring regulation to a model built on ra-
tional choice assumptions will be no less legitimate than will tailoring regula-
tion to any other, equally non-descriptive model. 65
Recognizing instead that deviations from rational choice theory are non-
random and thus predictable, the supposed limitation on the value of behav-
ioral insights disappears. Non-random deviations permit the drawing of ex-
pectations about human behavior that more accurately model real human
conduct than do the rational choice assumptions.66 With those more accurate
expectations in place, scholars, policymakers, legislators, and courts can study
and implement rules of law based on those expectations.67 And rules of law
supra note 60, at 104; Albert Ando & Franco Modigliani, The "Life Cycle" Hypothesis of Sav-
ing: Aggregate Implications and Tests, 45 AM. EcON. REV. 55 (1963)).
63 See Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 111 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
EcoNoMics 1, 1-7 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) [hereinafter Introduction].
6 See Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against
Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOzo L. REV. 1517, 1523, 1534 (2012).
65 Critics of behavioralist arguments may object primarily to the terminology, inferring from
the word "irrational" that conduct is either unpredictable or contrary to natural norms. In fact,
there is nothing rational about conduct that is inconsistent with demonstrable norms of behavior,
or irrational about conduct that hews to those norms. "Rational choice," then, is simply a brand
that scholars have applied to idealized conduct. Definitions of rationality incorporate a prefer-
ence for self-interested, profit-maximizing conduct that appears systematically to be inconsistent
with real-life human behavior. Only by first accepting that normative preference can we apply
the pejorative sobriquet "irrational" to conduct in which nearly all persons actually engage. See
Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 522 (2007) [hereinafter Behavioral Economists at the Gate]; Claire Hill,
The Promise of Behavioral Law and Economics, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 7, 2010, 5:00
AM) ("'mistake'" may mean "'weakness of the will' . . . since a person really does want both
cake and good health"), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/12/07/claire-hill-on-the-promise-of-
behavioral-law-and-economics/. Many scholars understandably prefer to speak of "boundedly
rational" conduct. Tor, The Fable of Entry, supra note 7, at 484.
66 Cf DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECI-
SIONs, at xx (2008) (cite to introduction) ("Whether we are acting as consumers, businesspeople,
or policymakers, understanding how we are predictably irrational provides a starting point for
improving our decisionmaking and changing the way we live for the better.").
67 Complaints that behavioral law and economics is targeted toward the conduct of a handful
of individuals whose true behavior has been demonstrated empirically ignore that the empirical
studies serve to demonstrate true norms of behavior. Just as regulation based on the norm of
rational choice was only intended to be a perfect fit for the average, regulation based on an
empirically established norm that deviates from rational choice will only be a perfect fit for the
average. The difference is that the empirically established norm actually represents the average,
while regulating for the rational choice assumption is regulating on the basis of an outlier.
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built on assumptions of conduct following rational choice theory will be fun-
damentally flawed.
Behavioral economics operates by collecting data, whether from experi-
ments conducted in the laboratory or from the real world, and testing the axi-
oms of economics against that data.68 Laboratory experiments have become
increasingly sophisticated and present increasingly useful proxies for real-
world conduct.69 Frequently the data demonstrates that axioms on which the
Chicago School relies are wrong. Individual economic actors respond differ-
ently to stimuli than leading theories had predicted they would respond. Em-
pirical data provides new intuition, or confirms old intuition, regarding human
behavior. With that new or confirmed intuition, economic models may be re-
built to produce empirically supportable results. Behavioral law and econom-
ics then reexamines legal standards and rules of decision in the light of those
results.70
Behavioral economics is a close cousin of the study of information eco-
nomics, perhaps for which reason George Akerloff, Nobel Laureate for his
work in information economics, turned to behavioralism to explain human
conduct in his book Animal Spirits, co-written with Robert Schiller.71 Accord-
ing to Oren Bar-Gill, "The behavioral market failure, with its emphasis on
misperception and bias, is a direct extension of the imperfect information
problem."7 2
68 See Avishalom Tor, A Behavioural Approach to Antitrust Law and Economics, 14 CON-
SUMER POL'Y REv. 18, 18-19 (2004) [hereinafter A BehaviouralApproach] (behavioral econom-
ics is "grounded in empirical observations of human behaviour" and "based on scientific findings
regarding actual human behaviour, which can often provide better descriptions of market dynam-
ics and thus more effective prescriptions for competition policy"); cf Maurice E. Stucke, Money,
Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 893, 918 (2010) (experiments began on university students and migrated to "field
experiments and data from actual market transactions").
69 See, e.g., Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A
Primer, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 3, 9-10 (describing laboratory experiments
designed to test assumptions regarding cartel behavior).
70 See generally Douglas H. Ginsburg & Derek W. Moore, The Future of Behavioral Econom-
ics in Antitrust Jurisprudence, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 89, 92-95 (discussing
the development of behavioral economics and behavioral law and economics).
71 GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SCHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
DRIvES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 5 (2009) (noting prior
work in rational choice economics and the need to break from that tradition to explain economic
activity).
72 Oren Bar-Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection: A Behavioral Economics Account, in
SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY, THE PROS AND CONS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 1, 4-5
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Competition and Consumer Protection], available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1974499. Others have observed this as well, not all of
them champions of Behavioral Antitrust. See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger, Behavioral Economics,
Consumer Protection, and Antitrust, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2010, at 65, 69-70
(2010) (comparing information asymmetries with deviations from rational choice).
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Thus, marketers might rely on information asymmetries through non-dis-
closure of certain costs (subject to limits imposed by fraud and deception
claims), or they might accomplish the same end through the technique of
"drip pricing." Drip pricing is a well-studied technique of exploiting individu-
als' empirically demonstrated tendencies to make soft (psychological) com-
mitments on the basis of "salient"-prominent-up-front prices before they
learn of other expenses that might fundamentally alter the nature of the trans-
action." AirTran Airways, Inc. recently settled Department of Transportation
charges with regard to fare advertising that excluded taxes and fees from the
advertised ticket price, making information about those taxes and fees availa-
ble but not readily apparent.74 The practice at issue might be considered either
to rely on information asymmetries, if consumers were not meaningfully in-
formed about the actual price, or to rely on drip pricing, if consumers were
merely committed before being informed.
For another example of the relationship between information economics
and behavioral economics, information economics is credited with carrying
the day in Eastman Kodak Corp. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., where the
Court recognized that purchasers unable realistically to engage in life-cycle
pricing of photocopiers could become locked in to a particular brand, giving
monopoly power in parts and services aftermarkets to defendant Kodak." As
73 See Reeves & Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 6, at 1541 (defining drip pricing); cf
ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE & PRACTICE 59-66 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Sc-
ENCE & PRACTICE] (describing larger impacts of inducing commitment with regard to small
initial decisions). The UK Office of Fair Trading has concluded that drip pricing is one of the
two most pernicious pricing practices from the perspective of causing purchasers to spend more
than they wished (in the absence of the pricing practice) to spend. See UK OFFICE OF FAIR
TRADING, ADVERTISING OF PRICES (OFT 1291) (2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFT
work/markets-work/advertising-prices/.
74 The Department of Transportation recently fined Airtran Airways, Inc., for "deceptive price
advertising" in violation of DOT rule 14 C.F.R. § 399.84 (2011), governing the manner in which
fees and taxes may be separated from airfare advertisements. According to the consent agree-
ment between Airtran and DOT:
AirTran displayed an advertisement on various third-party websites stating "Select
destination on SALE Starting at $59 one way." The advertisement contained two aster-
isks, one following the fare and the other below the fare next to a statement reading,
without further elaboration, "Additional taxes, fees, exclusions apply." Nowhere in the
advertisement were the nature and amount of the additional taxes stated. Rather, once
the consumer clicked on the advertisement, he or she was taken to a landing page on
AirTran's website, where a list of routes and prices were displayed and consumers
were not advised of the details of the additional taxes and fees, stated in fine print,
unless they scrolled to the bottom of the page.
AirTran Airways, Inc., DOT Docket No. OST-2012-0002, at 2 (Jan. 4, 2012) (consent order).
Such a marketing practice might be said to rely for its success on asymmetric information with
regard to the amount of fees and taxes being charged (although disclosure would occur before the
consumer made payment). The practice is an example of behavioral exploitation through drip
pricing, encouraging consumers to commit psychologically before learning the additional ex-
pense to which they will be subjected.
7 Eastman Kodak Corp. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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explained in greater detail below, behavioral economics would bolster that
explanation with lessons about the marketing technique of drip pricing and
proven cognitive biases such as "hyperbolic discounting" of future events,
whereby perceived short-term benefits overwhelm medium- and long-term
consequences of decisions. 76
II. BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST
Cass Sunstein recommended in 2000 that scholars and policymakers devote
their energies to applications of behavioral economics in legal policymaking,7
though a few legal scholars had already been working in that direction. The
enterprise took off early in fields including litigation economics,' criminal
law,79 corporate governance,s0 and consumer protection.8' It has been slower
to be applied to antitrust, although since 2002 scholars have been doing so.
A. EARLY APPLICATIONS To ANTITRUST
1. Studying Conduct by Firms
Avishalom Tor was the earliest student of behavioralist teachings in anti-
trust. Tor's writings in the area began with The Fable of Entry: Bounded Ra-
tionality, Market Discipline and Legal Policy.8 2 He stated a more general
76 According to Professor Bar-Gill:
[A] hyperbolic discounter heavily discounts costs and benefits that will materialize in
the near future, at t+1, but assigns only a smaller additional discount for costs (and
benefits) that will materialize in the more distant future, at t+2. This systematic dispar-
ity between people's short-term and long-term discount rates has been consistently
demonstrated both in the laboratory and in real-world settings.
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373, 1396 (2004) [hereinafter
Seduction].
77 See Sunstein, Introduction, supra note 63.
78 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL.
L. REV. 113, 144 (1996).
79 See, e.g., David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, Crime, Punishment, and Myopia 2 (Nat'1 Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11491, 2005) (finding that high discount rates for
criminals undermines a rational-choice-based expected cost analysis), available at http://www.
nber.org/papers/wl 1491.
so See, e.g., Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 237.
st The Federal Trade Commission has long regulated conduct on the basis of a sophisticated
understanding of limitations in purchasers' abilities to maximize their economic self-interest.
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. pt. 429 (2011) (door-to-door sales rule imposing a cooling-off period and
requiring notice of a three-day right of rescission). The Commission also has published guides
that may influence behavior to similar ends. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 238 (bait-and-switch sales tech-
niques); 16 C.F.R. pt. 251 (guide concerning use of the word "free" and similar representations).
The Chicago Law Review held a symposium on behavioral economics in the law of consumer
protection. See generally Symposium, Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus, and the Law and
Economics of Consumer Choice, 73 U. Ci. L. REV. 1 (2006).
82 Tor, The Fable of Entry, supra note 7.
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theory in A Behavioral Approach to Antitrust Law and Economics,"3 and, with
William Rinner, discussed the application of Behavioral Antitrust to resale
price maintenance in Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of
Reason After Leegin.8 4 Oren Bar-Gill demonstrated in 2005 that the bounds
behavioralists recognize on consumer decisionmaking may have policy impli-
cations for antitrust rules governing tying and bundling." Maurice Stucke
more recently has argued-in articles, including Morality and Antitrust,16 Be-
havioral Economists at the Gate," and Behavioral Antitrust (with Amanda
Reeves) 8 -about the inevitability of courts' rethinking antitrust law in light
of knowledge of human conduct in the economic marketplace.
Central axioms of antitrust economics posit that the economic marketplace
can be modeled with perfect utility maximization on the parts of both sellers
and purchasers-as Michael Salinger puts it, "sacrific[ing] realism for tracta-
bility."89 In contrast, recent scholarship has challenged the assumption that
sellers conduct themselves in ways that maximize their utility.90 The conclu-
sions of that research undermine established rules of decision in antitrust."
In addition to those first movers in the application of behavioral economics
to antitrust, other scholars, judges, and practitioners recently have joined the
conversation. Deven Desai and Spencer Waller discussed concepts in antitrust
that turn on the realities of human cognition, although without explicitly
couching their analysis as one of Behavioral Antitrust.92 Christopher Leslie
wrote that courts' understanding of the economic rationality of firm conduct
was ill-informed, producing erroneous rules of decision.93 Leslie also dealt
with the phenomenon of cognitively biased courts.9 4 Firmly in the mold of
Behavioral Antitrust scholarship, Leslie criticized conclusions that conduct by
firms made "no economic sense," and therefore could be presumed not to
have taken place at all, when, in fact, the evidence was strong or irrefutable
83 Tor, A Behavioural Approach, supra note 68.
84 Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of
Reason after Leegin, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 805.
85 Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33, 53 (2006)
[hereinafter Bundling and Consumer Misperception].
86 Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 443.
87 Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate, supra note 65.
88 Reeves & Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 6.
89 Salinger, supra note 72, at 66.
9 See, e.g., Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate, supra note 65; Tor & Rinner, supra
note 84.
91 See infra notes 125-135 and accompanying text.
92 See Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 BYU L.
REV. 1425.
93 See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261,
285-308 (2010).
94Id. at 308-18.
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that the conduct did in fact occur.95 Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck "fo-
cus[ed] . .. on non-standard approaches to firm behavior," keeping consumers
"in the background." 96 They show the usefulness of laboratory studies better
to understand collusion, oligopoly conduct short of collusion, and unilateral
conduct.97
In important ways Behavioral Antitrust may be the strongest application of
behavioral law and economics. First, law and economics generally has in-
formed antitrust rules of decision more completely than any other substantive
field.98 Second, the most voluble complaints about the application of behav-
ioral economics to legal policy relate to "first-order regulation," in which gov-
ernment supplants private ordering. For example, David Friedman noted
problems with application of behavioral economics in such areas as airline
security. Regulators' tendencies to "overestimate the importance of striking
low probability events" (such as terrorist attacks) has led to intrusive security,
which reduces airline traffic and thus increases road traffic fatalities, perhaps
even out of proportion to the initial threat to be avoided.99 Such challenges,
including concerns for cognitively biased or politically motivated regulators'"
and slippery slopes toward over-regulation,'01 do not apply to "second-order
regulation" that seeks to maintain free markets by correcting for failures
brought on by private ordering, rather than to regulate those markets
directly.102
2. Critics
Others are less willing to accept the importance of Behavioral Antitrust.
The Chicago-leaning publication Competition Policy International published
in Winter 2010 a symposium edition on behavioral economics in antitrust and
consumer protection, containing articles by noted commentators, including
95 Id. at 318-38.
96 Armstrong & Huck, supra note 69, at 4.
97 See id. at 6-7.
91 See Waller, Virus, supra note 31, at 381-87.
9 David D. Friedman, Intriguing Research Project, with Reservations, TRUTH ON THE MAR-
KET (Dec. 6, 2010, 8:15 AM), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/12/06/david-friedman-on-be-
havioral-economics-intriguing-research-project-with-reservations/.
1oo See Richard Thaler, Rejoinder to the TOTM Free to Choose Symposium, TRUTH ON THE
MARKET (Dec. 13, 2010, 7:25 AM) [hereinafter Rejoinder] ("Professor Warren would be well
advised to assume that there will eventually be a nitwit heading [the CFPA] for a while."), http://
truthonthemarket.com/2010/12/13/richard-thalers-rejoinder-to-the-totm-free-to-choose-sympo-
sium/.
' Larry Ribstein, Free to Lose?, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 6, 2010, 8:18 AM), http://truth
onthemarket.com/2010/12/06/larry-ribstein-on-free-to-losel.
102 Cf HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 18, at 14-15 (distinguishing "reac-
tive" antitrust enforcement from "positive" administrative enterprises like electricity rate
regulation).
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Judge Douglas Ginsburg'03 and Michael Salinger.'" Both Ginsburg and Salin-
ger dispute the relevance of behavioral economics to antitrust. Salinger de-
scribes differing reactions to behavioral economics in political terms. "In both
consumer protection and antitrust, the use of standard economic analysis has
generally been to limit the scope of government intervention. The interest in
behavioral economics (and some of the resistance to it) stems from the belief
that it justifies intervention that conventional economic analysis suggests is
unwarranted." 05
A recent article by Joshua Wright and Judd Stone takes broader aim at the
study of Behavioral Antitrust, articulating an "irrelevance theorem" that they
argue demonstrates "behavioral economics . . . fails to offer any clear policy
implications for antitrust law." 06 Wright and Stone challenge the work of Tor,
Stucke, and Leslie in arguing that Behavioral Antitrust currently offers no
policy prescriptions that can be implemented. 07 Even then-Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Carl Shapiro declined to endorse behavioral economics' rel-
evance to the antitrust analysis of firm conduct. 08
Critics question the capacity of behavioral insights to inform antitrust rules
of decision. Judge Ginsburg and Derek Moore argue that Behavioral Antitrust
is too great a deviation from the economic theory that has held sway in anti-
trust decisionmaking.'09 They believe it opens the door to undisciplined analy-
sis and "whimsical" goals in antitrust jurisprudence and increases courts'
freedom to pursue "idiosyncratic" goals." 0 However, Ginsburg and Moore do
not provide any evidence supporting that concern. That is a general comment
on the critics of Behavioral Antitrust. Wright and Stone speak of a "burden of
proof' on the proponents of Behaviorat Antitrust, although they give no rea-
son why any one particular approach should be the default."'
103 Ginsburg & Moore, supra note 70.
"01 Salinger, supra note 72.
os Id. at 66.
"o6 Wright & Stone, supra note 64, at 1527, 1526.
107 See id. at 1521-22, 1533-34 (commenting on recent work by Stucke, Tor, and Leslie).
108 Carl Shapiro, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen. for Econ., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks to the
ABA Antitrust Symposium: Competition as Public Policy 3 (May 13, 2009), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.pdf. Although Shapiro backtracked from that state-
ment with regard to predicting consumer behavior, his view of the use of behavioral economics
in predicting organizational behavior did not appear to change. See Roundtable Interview with
Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2010, at 8 [hereinafter Roundtable
Interview], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishinglantitrust_source/Feb10_Farr
ShapRT2.25f.authcheckdam.pdf.
109 Ginsburg & Moore, supra note 70.
W t t Id.
' Wright & Stone, supra note 64, at 1522.
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Wright and Stone's recent examination of Behavioral Antitrust concentrates
on the question of non-utility-maximizing behavior by firms. Their article dis-
penses quickly with the question of consumers' deviations from the rational
choice model, arguing that demand elasticity analyses take into account any
consumer decisionmaking biases.112 If a consumer's reservation price is deter-
mined to be X, any biases are built into that reservation price, and what those
biases are may not be important for antitrust analysis." 3 That point is correct
for purposes of determining market power, a process that currently requires
modeling hypothetical consumer behavior in response to price increases.114
But it does not undermine the value of understanding consumer behavior in
antitrust policymaking. Conduct by firms that relates to the structure of a
transaction with their consumers, such as marketing, pricing, tying, and bun-
dling, presents the danger of adverse welfare effects that may be exacerbated
by limitations on individual consumers' cognitive abilities."' I propose below
an antitrust application of the theory of behavioral exploitation through which
firms may be structuring their conduct specifically to take advantage of those
limitations, with attendant welfare effects that bring it within the heartland of
conduct antitrust policy should encompass."'
One also might question whether critics of Behavioral Antitrust would ac-
cept the conclusions that empirical studies of consumer behavior might pro-
duce. For example, criticisms of FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., which
supported a narrowly drawn product market on the basis of consumers'
demonstrated preferences," 7 invoke theoretical arguments about the unprofit-
ability of a price hike due to price-sensitive marginal consumers." Professors
Desai and Waller provide an explanation for many commentators' aversion to
drawing product markets narrowly even where evidence of consumer behav-
11
2 Id. at 1523.
113 For this reason, the concern for conflicting cognitive biases is overstated. See Thom Lam-
bert, Behavioral Law and Economics and the Conflicting Quirks Problem: A "Realist" Critique,
TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 6, 2010, 10:35 AM), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/12/06/real-
ism-and-behavioral-law-and-economics/. A test of consumer behavior in a real market setting
necessarily will incorporate the range of biases that laboratory experiments have teased out. It
may not always be possible to intuit the result in terms of the operative bias, but the empirical
result (if robust) will provide a basis for antitrust analysis and possibly intervention.
11
4 See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
"s Cf Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, supra note 85, at 54 (discussing bun-
dling "as a strategic response to consumer misperception").
116 Behavioral exploitation as a form of conduct appears to have been first defined in 2008. See
Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 325 (2008).
117 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1043-45 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Tatel, J.,
concurring).
118 See, e.g., Kevin Arquit, Keynote Address: ILI 2009 Symposium, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1,
23 (2010).
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ior supports the result. They demonstrate in their article, Brands, Competition,
and the Law, that antitrust law fails sufficiently to recognize the impacts of
brands on consumer decisionmaking, with consequences for, among other
things, product market definition." 9 Desai and Waller thus encourage an ap-
proach that relies on consumers' demonstrated preferences (for, in their argu-
ment, well-developed brands), if proof can be made of the competitive impact
of those preferences.
Some critics of Behavioral Antitrust appear at bottom to contend that the
complications behavioral economics introduces into antitrust analysis render
the enterprise too cumbersome for use.120 The "too complex" complaint is an
old one. It explains the limited inroads of information economics in antitrust
economics. Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz's 1976 demonstration that
simplifying assumptions in economic analysis render that analysis inapplica-
ble to the real world carries equal weight in the Behavioral Antitrust debate.' 2'
If the argument is that reality makes economics unworkable, the conclusion
might be that it is economics that should go, not reality.
3. Result Neutrality
Behavioral Antitrust is result-neutral.'22 Wright and Stone correctly argue
that Behavioral Antitrust "does not systematically support a more interven-
tionist competition policy."'23 Reeves and Stucke agree: "Behavioral econom-
ics does not necessarily call for less or more antitrust regulation." 24 This
recognition provides the strongest hope that a Neo-Chicago antitrust policy
119 Desai & Waller, supra note 92, at 1475-76.
120 See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, Interesting Doesn't Necessarily Mean Policy Relevant,
TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 6, 2010, 10:25 AM) (noting the challenges of understanding the
aggregate impacts of sometimes conflicting biases), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/12/06/
geoffrey-manne-on-interesting-doesnt-necessarily-mean-policy-relevant/; Lambert, supra note
113 (making the same argument).
121 See Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:
An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. EcoN. 629 (1976). Rothschild and
Stiglitz argue:
Economic theorists traditionally banish discussions of information to footnotes. Seri-
ous consideration of costs of communication, imperfect knowledge, and the like
would, it is believed, complicate without informing. This paper, which analyzes com-
petitive markets in which the characteristics of the commodities exchanged are not
fully known to at least one of the parties to the transaction, suggests that this comfort-
ing myth is false. Some of the most important conclusions of economic theory are not
robust to considerations of imperfect information.
Id. at 629.
122 Cf Thaler, Rejoinder, supra note 100 (denying any political agenda for behavioral
economics).
123 Wright & Stone, supra note 64, at 1526.
124 Reeves & Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 6, at 1543.
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will find common ground with advocates of Behavioral Antitrust in service of
a less ideological enterprise of economically informed antitrust.
If behavioral economics teaches that individuals are not perfect expected
utility maximizers-in fact, individuals predictably deviate from that assump-
tion toward, among other traits, altruism-antitrust doctrine might recognize
the existence of such unicorns as the benevolent monopolist, who can be re-
lied on not to use monopoly power to the detriment of consumers.'25 Other
examples of altruistic market players wielding monopoly power (including
joint power in the case of conspiracy) might include educational institutions,
which have in the past been the subject of antitrust scrutiny for their conduct
in both sports and educational marketplaces;'26 and members of learned pro-
fessions, over whose conduct a deep body of doctrine also has developed.' 27 If
empirical evidence were to demonstrate that non-economic motivations over-
came (with sufficient frequency not to be de minimis) profit motives for those
or other actors, Behavioral Antitrust might support less regulatory interven-
tion than has been the norm. That might take the form of adopting a rule of
reason approach, under which the effects of the conduct could be tested em-
pirically on a case-by-case basis, to conduct that in other markets would be
subject to per se condemnation. The lessons from empirical study might also
inform a quick look or rule of reason approach with proof of non-economic
justifications for conduct.'28
Of course, Behavioral Antitrust also raises the possibility of enforcement
where it has in recent decades not been considered appropriate. Evidence of
predatory conspiracies in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.'29 and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.13 0
125 See White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 540 F. Supp. 951, 1007 n.20 (W.D.
Mich. 1982) (finding that low prices by a "benevolent monopolist" are not a basis for avoiding
antitrust liability), rev'd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983).
126 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (evaluating a
conspiracy to restrict output in collegiate football); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d
Cir. 1993) (applying a rule of reason analysis to agreements among elite universities not to
compete for a certain student population).
127 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FrC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (evaluating an advertising restriction
imposed by professional regulatory body); Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332
(1982) (evaluating maximum price fixing by private association of medical doctors); Nat'l Soc'y
of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (evaluating an agreement restricting com-
petitive bidding among engineers); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (evaluating a
fee schedule by a state bar association).
128 For example, in NCAA the defendant schools unsuccessfully argued the preservation of the
product of college football and the college game day warranted output restrictions. See NCAA,
468 U.S. at 115-17. In Brown University, the defendants successfully argued in favor of a rule of
reason approach on the basis of the non-economic benefits of enhancing the educational experi-
ence. Brown University, 5 F.3d at 677-78.
129 75 U.S. 574 (1986).
130 509 U.S. 209 (1992).
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failed to prevent judgment as a matter of law because the Court relied on
theoretical arguments that the alleged conspiracies could not survive and harm
consumers if the conspirators acted rationally. Accepting the possibility that
defendants in either case were not profit maximizers-perhaps motivated by a
desire for market dominance or national glory-could lead to a different
result.131
Likewise, dismissal was appropriate in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblyl32
because economic theory predicted that under the particular circumstances of
the industry, profit-maximizing firms could be expected unilaterally to engage
in parallel or interdependent conduct, which is not illegal. 3 Allegations of
parallel or interdependent conduct thus did not plausibly demonstrate a con-
spiracy. 134 But if empirical study were to demonstrate that the observed paral-
lel-conduct equilibrium could not be reached without conspiracy, because, for
example, firms favored competitive success as defined by market share above
profits, allegations of parallel conduct would plausibly support a claim of
conspiracy.'35
B. BEHAVIORAL EXPLOITATION
It is axiomatic that the goal of modem antitrust is to maximize consumer
welfare. That seems an impossible task if we do not understand the consumer.
Behavioral economics promises to help fill that knowledge gap.'36
Notably, scholars who have explored Behavioral Antitrust have concen-
trated almost exclusively on the behavior of firms, arguing that collections of
individuals will be affected by the biases that affect those individuals (even if
the impact of those biases is muted or more difficult to comprehend).'37 Their
work has been subject to challenge in part because of the difficulty of demon-
31 See Leslie, supra note 93, at 293-95 (noting goals other than profit maximization facing
some business firms); id. at 319-24 (discussing courts' refusal or inability to accept direct evi-
dence that contravenes theory); Avishalom Tor, Illustrating a Behaviorally Informed Approach
to Antitrust Law: The Case of Predatory Pricing, ANTITRUST, Fall 2003, at 52, 55-56 (discussing
"risk-seeking predatory behavior").
132 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
133 Id. at 553-54.
134 Id.; see Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy
Claims, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 627, 652 (2008) (neutral facts not sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss on the question of conspiracy).
135 Cf Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate, supra note 65, at 532-36 (arguing that firms
may not be profit maximizers).
136 Cf Roundtable Interview, supra note 108, at 7-8 (noting the value of "attent[ion] to the
evidence regarding consumer behavior").
137 See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (citing work by Stucke, Tor, Rinner, Leslie,
Armstrong, and Huck).
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strating the aggregate effect of cognitive biases across the conduct of entire
firms.138
I concentrate instead on the effect of consumers' inability to maximize their
utility. Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Carl Shapiro, a leading
commentator and enforcer who had expressed skepticism of the contributions
of Behavioral Antitrust, nonetheless recognized the value of Behavioral Anti-
trust for better understanding consumer behavior. Shapiro noted:
Any time we are trying to understand and predict consumer responses we
need to be attentive to the evidence regarding consumer behavior. That may
well involve various behavioral issues.
For example, consumers react to surcharges and discounts differently, and
in some cases that can be part of the analysis. We also have to look at things
like advertising competition, which relates to consumer behavior. We often
have issues of reputation or branding that relate to consumers and their re-
sponse to those images and those brands. So we are regularly dealing with
consumer responses to a firm's strategies, which get us into behavioral
economics. 39
And academic critics of Behavioral Antitrust appear to accept the relevance of
the behavioralist critique with regard to consumer (as opposed to firm)
behavior.140
1. Exploiting Decisionmaking Biases
Behavioral exploitation is intentionally exploiting known biases in deci-
sionmaking by consumers.141 Merchant sellers employing sophisticated mar-
keting practices are known to engage in such conduct in the ordinary course
of their business.142 Courts and regulators have for decades recognized the
reality of behavioral exploitation in the commercial marketplace.143 And aca-
138 See Wright & Stone, supra note 64, at 1524 ("[I]t does not follow that firms necessarily
behave with similar, or similarly predictable, consequences.").
139 Roundtable Interview, supra note 108, at 7-8. Joseph Farrell, Director of the Bureau of
Economics at the Federal Trade Commission, agrees Id. at 8. ("1 think that's right.").
140 Wright & Stone, supra note 64, at 1523, 1549.
141 Huffman, Bridging the Divide, supra note 19, at 22; cf Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer
Misperception, supra note 85, at 47 (referring to sellers' "exploiting consumer misperception").
Behavioral exploitation can occur in the opposite direction as well, where a sophisticated pur-
chaser exploits decisionmaking biases held by the seller.
142 See generally ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (revised
ed. 2007) [hereinafter PSYCHOLOGY].
143 See Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) (interpreting the
deception standard under FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45, broadly to protect "the ignorant, the
unthinking and the credulous"); Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968) (finding cause of action for common law misrepresentation where dance studio
"blandish[ed] and cajole[d]" naive consumer, conduct that is closer to behavioral exploitation
than to the traditional view of deception). The FTC's 1983 policy statement on deception is not
to the contrary, although it may contravene the broadest reading of Charles of the Ritz. Accord-
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demic commentators recognize the ability of sophisticated sellers to profit at
the expense of less-sophisticated purchasers in zero-sum competitions for sur-
plus welfare. 1" Nor is it new that commercial conduct targeting consumers,
rather than competitors, can be anticompetitive.145
Behavioral economics describes decisionmaking heuristics that operate to
interfere with individual consumers' abilities to maximize their utility in bar-
gaining. The heuristics are sometimes discussed interchangeably with strate-
gies that can be employed to exploit them. One heuristic, discussed above, is
hyperbolic discounting; drip pricing is a technique for exploiting it.146 Another
relevant heuristic is "anchoring," which describes the tendency to see a partic-
ular value in relation to a possibly unrelated reference point.147 A savvy seller
can "frame" the consumer's decision in a way to take advantage of the
ing to the FTC in 1983, "When representations or sales practices are targeted to a specific audi-
ence, the Commission determines the effect of the practice on a reasonable member of that
group. In evaluating a particular practice, the Commission considers the totality of the practice in
determining how reasonable consumers are likely to respond." Letter from James C. Miller III,
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to the Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Comm. on En-
ergy and Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983) (later labeled by the FTC as its "Policy Statement on Decep-
tion"), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmtlad-decept.htm. The policy statement also
gives an example-"[d]epending on the circumstances, accurate information in the text may not
remedy a false headline because reasonable consumers may glance only at the headline"-that
closely tracks the Department of Transportation's charge against AirTran Airways for price ad-
vertising in violation of DOT regulations, which I use above as an example of drip pricing. See
discussion supra at note 74; see also Cavendish Elithorn, Remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Mara-
thon, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 1, 28-30 (2010) (appended to Huffman, Bridging the Divide, supra
note 19); UK OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, JOINING UP COMPETITION AND CONSUMER POLICY: THE
OFT's APPROACH TO BUILDING AN INTEGRATED AGENCY 3.9 (OFT 1151) (2009), available at
www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/speeches/2009/spe- 1209.pdf.
14 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 69
(2008); Edward J. Janger & Susan Block-Lieb, Consumer Credit and Competition: The Puzzle of
Competitive Credit Markets, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 68, 70 (2010) (discussing lenders' abilities
to compete with opaque transaction terms that undermine consumers' abilities to protect their
interests); Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcoNoMics, supra note 63, at 137-38 (noting that the effect of decision-
making biases on contracting may be to undermine optimal resource allocation through private
transactions); cf LACKO, supra note 39 (analyzing information asymmetry and the consequent
"lemons equilibrium" where low quality products predominate in a market). See generally Salin-
ger, supra note 72, at 76 (citing Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model
of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 493 (1977), and ac-
knowledging the ability of merchants to exploit uninformed purchasers even in markets with
informed purchasers, with specific recognition of pricing practices that exploit bounds on
cognition).
145 See Desai & Waller, supra note 92; William S. Comanor & Thomas A. Wilson, The Effect
of Advertising on Competition: A Survey, 17 J. EcON. LITERATURE 453 (1979).
146 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
147 See Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and Eco-
nomic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 Ky. L.J. 535, (2006) ("Anchoring describes
the process by which an individual attaches a particular value to an item because the value is
'available' or 'strongly present in the mind.'").
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anchoring heuristic.148 A common example is that of televisions in an elec-
tronics store. Although a consumer may not seriously consider purchasing the
$5000 model, its very presence increases the consumer's reservation price.149
A third is the "ownership bias" or "endowment effect," whereby "an indi-
vidual's valuation of an entitlement depends on whether the individual is
given initial ownership of that entitlement."s 0 The classic demonstration of
the endowment effect is the coffee mug experiment reported by Daniel
Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler in 1991; students "endowed"
with coffee mugs consistently value them more highly than do students en-
dowed with money, when the two groups are told to bargain for voluntary
exchanges."' Tendencies toward over-optimism have also been empirically
demonstrated.152 The optimism bias likely underlies consumer credit decisions
such as agreeing to short-term teaser rates that lead to increased payments in
the future, on the basis of probabilistically unwarranted optimism with regard
to the likelihood of the consumer carrying a balance after the rate increases.15
2. Behavioral Exploitation and Antitrust
The antitrust implications of firms' well-known practices of exploiting pur-
chasers' cognitive biases have not been analyzed sufficiently. The antitrust
theory of behavioral exploitation explores the competitive consequences of
the realities of the relationship between merchants-sophisticated sellers-
'4 See generally ARIELY, supra note 66, at 1-8 (giving examples). Many treat the "framing
effect" as a separate heuristic. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through
Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 206 (2006).
149 See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Prison, Death, and Anchoring, 847 PLI/Lit 235, 237-38 (2010).
Robert Cialdini describes this as the "retail store sales practice of 'talking the top of the line,'"
and gives a real-world example of an experiment run in a retail store by pool table manufacturer
Brunswick Corporation: during one week customers were first introduced to the low end of the
line, and during the second week they were first introduced to the top end of the line. The
average sale in the first week was $550 and the average sale in the second week exceeded $1000.
See CIALDINI, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 142, at 47 (quoting sources).
1s0 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 148, at 205.
'' See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193. Although the
coffee mug experiment has been criticized as being overly stylized, subsequent experiments do a
better job of approximating real-world contracting situations. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 630, 673-74 (1999) (canvassing the literature and giving examples).
152 See Bar-Gill, Seduction, supra note 76, at 1395-401.
'53 See id.; Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Con-
tracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1120-21 (2009) [hereinafter Subprime Mortgage Contracts].
As with many cognitive biases that have been empirically proved in recent decades, the phenom-
enon of excessive optimism has been understood for centuries. See Armstrong & Huck, supra
note 69, at 26 & n.91 (citing Nava Ashraf et al., Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist, J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 2005, at 131) (discussing Adam Smith).
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and consumers, who are relatively nafve.15 4 Where a merchant's intentional
behavioral exploitation crosses the line separating mere persuasion (advertis-
ing) from compulsion (behavioral exploitation), the exploitation is conduct
that, when combined with other elements of an antitrust claim, may bring
about antitrust harm.'55
Consumer marketplaces are comprised of myriad individual transactions
between consumers and merchants, each contributing to the aggregate of eco-
nomic activity. In individual transactions parties engage in zero-sum bargain-
ing over surplus welfare.15 6 The outcome of the transaction impacts the
parties, who are bound to the transaction terms reached.'5 1 It also impacts the
parties' immediate competitors, who are excluded from the particular transac-
tion once it concludes.'15 Only when an individual transaction is large enough
will it impact the market more broadly, producing what is called an effect on
competition.' 59 An effect on competition also will occur when a sufficiently
large set of de minimis transactions are in the aggregate substantial relative to
the size of the market.
The dominant characteristic of transactions in markets in which individual
end-user purchasers deal directly with merchants in consumer goods transac-
tions is the disparity in sophistication between the parties to the transaction.
"Merchants" are by common definition repeat players who are educated in the
products and services they sell and in the legal rules and market norms gov-
154 It might be possible to articulate a variation on Wright and Stone's "irrelevance theorem" in
response to the theory of behavioral exploitation, if, for example, both firms and consumers were
cognitively biased and those biases interacted either unpredictably or in a nullifying manner. See
supra note 106 and accompanying text. I argue that the relative lack of sophistication renders
consumers more susceptible to cognitive biases than firms. See generally Armstrong & Huck,
supra note 69, at 4-5 (articulating "a number of reasons why one might expect firms to be better
decision makers than consumers").
155 Both of the primary antitrust standards-concerted conduct and dominant firm conduct-
require proof of conduct in combination with other elements, depending on whether the claim is
brought under Section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. See Anderson & Huffman,
supra note 10, at 29-51.
156 Surplus welfare is the amount the purchaser is willing to spend in excess of the cost of
production for the seller. KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTIRUST LAW: ECONOMic THEORY AND COMMON
LAW EVOLUTION 3 (2003). The bargaining in an individual transaction is zero-sum because it is
static in nature and does not have the capacity to shift the supply or demand curves in a way that
increases aggregate welfare.
157 The binding occurs both contractually and extra-contractually through transaction costs.
158 This sort of exclusion is in itself not an antitrust harm. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that "virtually every contract to buy
'forecloses' or 'excludes' alternative sellers from some portion of the market"). But antitrust law
is implicated if the exclusion is on the basis of something other than the merits of the prevailing
merchant's offerings.
159 This might occur if the transaction is a long term supply contract, see, for example, Nic-
Sand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2007) (evaluating allegations by plaintiff
that defendant monopolized the market by entering into long-term contracts with retailers), or a
particularly large government bid.
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erning the transaction.160 "Consumers," although the term is not by dictionary
definition so limited, normally connotes relatively naYve individual end user
consumers.16'
The disparity in sophistication offers two clear avenues through which a
merchant can take advantage of, and harm, the purchaser. The first is simple
deception, where through material false statements (or sometimes omissions)
the merchant deliberately misleads the purchaser.162 It has long been under-
stood that the profit-maximizing approach for a merchant is to engage in some
optimal level of deceptive conduct.163 What that optimal level is depends on
(1) whether the deception can be discovered after the fact, preventing repeat
business (and perhaps even leading to law enforcement'6), and (2) whether
the merchant hopes for repeat business from the purchaser in the first place.
The first of those conditions, which is a function of information asymmetry, is
met in the context of the typical merchant-consumer transaction. Sophisticated
merchants can often hide their deception from less sophisticated purchasers.165
The second condition is met where the merchant enjoys monopoly power as
well as-counter-intuitively-where the merchant participates in a market-
place characterized by perfect competition. As Michael Darby and Edi Karni
noted, players in perfectly competitive markets anticipate zero present value
of future profits from any one customer due to market characteristics such as
an infinity of sellers and buyers and costless switching.166
Behavioral exploitation presents concerns similar to deception. The theoret-
ical argument for there being an optimal amount of deception applies equally
to behavioral exploitation: so long as it is difficult to discover after the fact,
limiting concerns for loss of business or law enforcement, or the merchant
does not rely on the purchaser's repeat business, behavioral exploitation is a
160 See U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2007) (definition of "merchant").
161 Huffman, Bridging the Divide, supra note 19, at 9. But see infra notes 205-207 and accom-
panying text (describing behavioral exploitation against purchasers of durable office supplies).
162 See Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984) (finding that deception requires material
misrepresentation, practice, or omission); MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS
6-7 (5th ed. 2009).
163 POSNER, REGULATION, supra note 39; Darby & Karni, supra note 39, at 86-87 (summariz-
ing their assumptions and conclusions); LACKO, supra note 39, at 1 (noting "[tlhe inability of
consumers to observe quality prior to purchase creates incentives for sellers to attempt to earn
profits through misrepresentation and cheating on quality" and that "[slellers also face incentives
pushing them in the opposite direction" in the presence of asymmetric information).
164 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (FTC Act § 5) (outlawing "deceptive acts or practices"); see, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-88-107 (West 2011) (covering "[d]eceptive and unconscionable trade prac-
tices"); Jones v. West Side Buick, 93 S.W.2d 1083 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936) (common-law fraud).
165 Darby & Karni, supra note 39, at 69 (giving the example of auto mechanic services);
LACKO, supra note 39, at 1 (finding that asymmetric information produces incentives to
mislead).
166 Darby & Karni, supra note 39, at 75. See generally W. Kip VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 3 (4th ed. 2005) (defining perfect competition).
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rational business strategy. The first criterion's satisfaction is almost tautologi-
cal in the case of behavioral exploitation, which is by definition subtle (or
hidden). Concerns for legal sanction are less substantial for behavioral ex-
ploitation than they are for deception. The regulation of behavioral exploita-
tion that does exist is much more marginal, and targeted, than that of
deception,167 though examples do exist of successful challenges to conduct
that meets the definition I rely on here.168 The second criterion frequently will
be met, for example, in the circumstance of durable goods transactions, where
the incidence of repeat business is low relative to the size of any individual
transaction.
The potential competitive concerns underlying behavioral exploitation are
threefold. First, efficient resource allocation is disturbed as consumers are in-
duced to enter transactions they would eschew but for the conduct. Resources
flow to consumers' ostensible, rather than actual, preferences. Aggregate wel-
fare is thereby diminished.169 It is important to distinguish this effect from the
demand-curve shifting that underlies dynamic competition. Behavioral ex-
ploitation is not a question of introducing and marketing new products, chang-
ing consumers' utility functions permanently (or until the next innovation
comes along). Behavioral exploitation is a question of a short-term shift in the
demand curve, altering consumers' views of their own utility functions long
enough to induce a hard (contractual) commitment to the transaction.
Second, behavioral exploitation might facilitate a merchant's gaining or
preserving a competitive advantage over a rival, raising concerns for monopo-
lization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act or unilateral effects in a merger
reviewed under Clayton Act Section 7. 70 A possible example of a firm's reli-
ance on behavioral exploitation in seeking market dominance comes from the
market for home mortgage lending in the years leading to the financial crisis.
According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Countrywide Financial, Inc.
achieved a leading position in its market through a course of marketing sub-
167 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. pt. 429 (2011) (door-to-door sales rule imposing a cooling-off period
and requiring notice of a three-day right of rescission); 14 C.F.R. pt. 399 (airfare advertising
regulation); see also discussion supra at note 74 (discussing the DOT consent order with AirTran
Airways).
168 See examples supra at notes 74 (AirTran Airways fine), 143, and accompanying text (citing
common-law decisions).
16 Cf Bar-Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection, supra note 72, at 4 (noting that "per-
ceived benefits" of a transaction may deviate from "actual benefits"); Bar-Gill, Subprime Mort-
gage Contracts, supra note 153, at 1130 (noting "welfare cost in the form of allocation
inefficiency: borrowers are not matched with the most efficient lender.").
170 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 18; see also 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 114, § 6 (uni-
lateral effects).
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prime home loans to consumers who failed to appreciate the long-term conse-
quences of their borrowing decisions."'
Third, it is possible to articulate theories of harm based on concerted ex-
ploitation by more than one firm. Concerted conduct may occur pursuant to an
agreement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 7 2 or through the
process of conscious parallelism. A likely example of consciously parallel
behavioral exploitation is the nearly industry-wide policy of unbundling
charges for checked bags in airline travel."' Unbundled baggage fees permit a
consumer to make a purchase decision on the basis of a salient, low up-front
price. When the obligation to pay the fee becomes apparent, some coinbina-
tion of lock-in effect in the form of non-refundable tickets or immutable
schedules likely renders the consumer unable to avoid the baggage charge.
Consciously parallel conduct does not provide a basis for Section 1 liability
under the current state of the law,'74 but the potential for conscious parallelism
is relevant to merger review under Clayton Act Section 7,175 and there have
71 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL & ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 105 (2011), available at http://www.
gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf. Testimony in 1998 by then-FTC Bureau Director Jodie Bernstein
before the U.S. Senate describes subprime transactions in terms that invoke strategies of exploit-
ing borrowers' decisionmaking heuristics, including drip pricing and framing. See Home Equity
Lending Abuses in the Subprime Mortgage Industry, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade
Commission, U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging (Mar. 16, 1998), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/os/1998/03/grass5.htm.
172 15 U.S.C. § 1.
173 See, e.g., Baggage Allowance, AMERICAN AIRLINES, http://www.aa.com/il8n/travellnfor-
mation/baggage/baggageAllowance.jsp?anchorEvent=false&from=Nav; Checked Baggage,
DELTA AIR LINES, http://www.delta.com/travelingcheckin/baggage/checked/index.jsp; Bag-
gage, UNITED AIR LINES, http://www.united.com/page/middlepage/0,6823,1031,00.html;
Checked Baggage, ALASKA AIR GROUP, http://www.alaskaair.com/content/travel-info/policies/
baggage-checked.aspx; Optional Service Fees & Government Taxes, U.S. AIRWAYS, http://www.
usairways.com/en-US/traveltools/specialneeds/ticketingpolicies/taxesfees.html?c=hp txt_01120.
Southwest Airlines is a notable exception, and Frontier Airlines' baggage fees are less than its
larger competitors. See Baggage Allowance, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, http://www.southwest.com/
html/customer-servicelbaggage/checked-bags-pol.html; Optional Service Fees, FRONTIER AIR-
LINES, http://www.frontierairlines.com/optional-service-fees.
As of January 2012 the Department of Transportation prohibits the related practice of disclos-
ing taxes and fees separately from the base ticket price. See 14 C.F.R. § 399.84(a) (2011). Com-
ments made by the Air Transport Association (a trade group representing airlines) in response to
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking demonstrate the perceived competitive benefit from advertis-
ing fares independently of taxes and fees, complaining that an airline may "be disadvantaged if it
is required to include those taxes and fees in the advertised price." See Enhancing Airline Pas-
senger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110, 23,142 (Apr. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts.
244, 250, 253, 259, 399).
174 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that tacit collusion is not
illegal).
175 See 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 114, § 7, at 24 ("Coordinated interac-
tion alternatively can involve parallel accommodating conduct not pursuant to a prior
understanding.").
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been calls for FTC Act Section 5 enforcement against conscious
parallelism. 176
C. BEHAVIORAL EXPLOITATION EXPLAINS MISUNDERSTOOD AUTHORITIES
Antitrust does not lack for its share of poorly understood authorities. Cases
including Kodak and Whole Foods demonstrate courts' appreciation of the
realities of contracting and purchasing behavior and the relevance of those
realities for antitrust rules of decision. Some holdings find scant support in
rational choice economic theory but are easy to understand using behavioral
insights.
The story of Eastman Kodak Corp. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. is well
known to students of antitrust law."' Kodak sold durable goods in the form of
expensive copiers for business and government use. Once purchased, custom-
ers lived with them for many years."' Repair and replacement of defective
parts was the dominant strategy for anybody who already owned the machine,
creating a lock-in effect after purchases were consummated.
The reality of such lock-in effects is common in modem consumer con-
tracting. Sometimes, as in Kodak, the product itself may be so expensive vis-
A-vis any post-purchase maintenance or updating costs that purchasers are cer-
tain to bear those after-the-fact costs rather than to replace the product, unless
some private remedy (warranty) or public law (e.g., lemon laws) undoes the
lock-in effect. Automobiles and major home appliances may offer one or both
of those protections.' 9 Second, the product itself, whether or not expensive,
may realistically be available only with a long-term service commitment. That
has been the case with some consumer electronics like cellular telephones.' 80
176 See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Conscious Parallelism Revisited, 47 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 589, 606
(2010) (arguing that FTC Act Section 5 enforcement against conscious parallelism may be possi-
ble). Notably, Donald Turner proposed a similar approach to conscious parallelism in 1962. See
Donald F. Turner, The Definition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 682 (1962) (arguing that FTC Act Section 5
enforcement is possible against tacit collusion). Federal courts have not been receptive to this
interpretation of Section 5. See E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.
1984); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
77 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
'78 Id. at 456-57.
17 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1795.8 (West 2012) (California's lemon law).
80 For example, although Apple's popular iPhone is available for sale "unlocked and contract
free" through Apple, see Select an iPhone, APPLE, http://store.apple.com/us/browse/home/shop-
iphone/family/iphone/iphone4s, the phone is discounted by $450 if purchased with a two-year
service contract from a carrier, such as AT&T Wireless, Verizon, or Sprint. See id. Earlier ver-
sions of the iPhone were only available with two-year contracts from AT&T. See In re Apple and
AT&TM Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-05132, 2011 WL 6018401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011)
(noting agreement over the reality of a required two-year service contract for the iPhone).
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The precise issue presented by Kodak related to claims for unlawful tying
under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Kodak was alleged to have tied
the service of copier repair, a competitive marketplace, to the provision of
parts for Kodak copiers, a market protected by Kodak's intellectual property.
For the tying claim to succeed, the plaintiff needed to prove market power in
the tying (parts) market. That in turn depended on the lock-in effect created by
the sale of the copy machines."' The interesting question in Kodak was
whether lock-in effects created market power for Kodak.
For those customers who already have made irrevocable purchase decisions
(or, if the lock-in effect derives from a contractual commitment like a two-
year service plan for cellular telephone or cable service, have sealed the con-
tract), the demand for parts and services is inelastic.'82 The Kodak Court ap-
preciated that fact when holding that Kodak could have market power in the
parts market, which it controlled through its intellectual property. 83
For the customers who have not yet committed to a purchase decision or
long-term contract, the demand is elastic. In Kodak, it was acknowledged that
the market for copiers was highly competitive. Competitors in the market for
these durable office products included IBM and Xerox, among several
others.18 4 Analogous consumer goods marketplaces, such as automobiles and
cellular telephones, are also highly competitive. The issue for finding market
power on the basis of lock-in effects is whether the elastic demand of uncom-
mitted purchasers constrains the sellers' pricing to the committed purchasers.
The answer is that it does if two conditions hold: (1) the pricing to commit-
ted purchasers is sufficiently transparent (defined by the cost of obtaining the
necessary information, including the cost of becoming aware of what informa-
tion is necessary) to become part of the purchasing decisions by the uncom-
181 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461-62.
182 The committed/uncommitted purchaser distinction can be analogized to the inframarginall
marginal purchaser distinction. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1039-41
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (distinguishing between "core" and "marginal" purchasers); HYLTON, supra
note 156, at 3. Marginal purchasers have highly price-elastic demand, which is represented by
their residing close to the equilibrium point on the supply-demand curve. Uncommitted purchas-
ers also are easily lost to competitors. By contrast, the inframarginal purchaser-the committed
purchaser in the Kodak story-has highly inelastic demand.
183 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 476. Kodak came to the Supreme Court on a challenge to summary
judgment for defendant on the question of market power. The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
reversal of summary judgment. At trial on remand the jury found monopoly power, and that
finding was upheld on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, partly on the basis of Kodak's waiver of its
objection to a jury instruction. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1206
(9th Cir. 1997).
84 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,402
(N.D. Cal. 1988) ("Plaintiffs do not contend Kodak possesses monopoly power in the new equip-
ment market in which it competes with Xerox, IBM, Bell and Howell, 3M, and various Japanese
manufacturers and holds no significant share.").
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mitted, and (2) the uncommitted purchasers are capable under the
circumstances of using the available information in reaching their decisions.
The Kodak dissent believed, correctly, that informed purchasers able to maxi-
mize their expected utility would constrain Kodak's exercise of market power
post-purchase.8 5 The market povier question is whether that constraint is suf-
ficient to prevent the seller's acting as a monopolist with regard to unin-
formed, or locked-in, purchasers.
1. The Informationist Justification
The Kodak Court found market power in the parts aftermarket (supporting
the parts-services tying claim) on the failure of the first condition. The Court
recognized the reality of information asymmetries-Kodak knew more than
its customers-in the equipment marketplace. Kodak was well positioned to
know the expected repair and replacement costs for each copier it sold, but
had no incentive to disclose that information to its customers. Its customers
(presumably with the exception of the largest and most sophisticated, who
could compile their own data on copier performance) did not have that knowl-
edge, and lacked a low-cost method of acquiring it.1' The information asym-
metries permitted Kodak to succeed in the highly price-elastic portion of the
market in which it contracted with uncommitted purchasers.
The same applies to the consumer marketplaces that are analogous to the
one in Kodak. Information on the costs incurred in the aftermarkets can be
difficult to acquire. Regular product innovation may defeat attempts by publi-
cations like Consumer Reports to compile reliable data on the cost to own
durable goods. For some products like cellular telephones, the costs associated
with service include, in addition to the monthly charge, the inconveniences of
service disruptions or equipment malfunction. The information on those costs
that is available to purchasers tends to be anecdotal, and service providers
lack incentive to disclose the data that they possess.'17 A significant part of the
consumer cost in service markets is the efficiency of the seller response to
purchaser needs. Sellers can hide those costs from purchasers through a vari-
ant on price discrimination-responding differently to uncommitted purchas-
185 See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 490-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This would be true in the absence of
fraud (dissemination of material misinformation) by Kodak.
186 It is questionable whether committed purchasers have incentives to disclose this information
to uncommitted purchasers or third-party aggregators. Certainly a committed purchaser has an
incentive to see that its competitors bear at least the same costs that it bears.
'5 Cf Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, supra note 85, at 33 n.1 ("The con-
cem that sellers will often lack the incentive to educate consumers is reinforced by the public-
good nature of such educational efforts. If a seller succeeds in correcting consumers' mispercep-
tions, competitors will be quick to adapt their products to the changed demand. And the seller,
who brought about this desirable change in demand, will not be able to recoup her investment in
educating consumers.").
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ers than to committed purchasers,18 which would explain shorter hold times if
a caller selected the "start new service" option when calling a cellular service
provider.'89 For these reasons, an informationist defense of Kodak would ar-
gue that uncommitted purchasers are often uninformed about the real state of
the relationship post-commitment, and thus' they are unable to constrain the
aftermarket pricing or conduct of the seller employing a lock-in strategy.'"
A critic might respond that purchasers save on up-front information costs,
and the market power created by the lock-in is only as great as the benefit to
the purchaser of avoiding those costs. At least in the absence of consciously
parallel conduct, where competitors find it profitable to imitate the strategy of
exploiting the information asymmetry, competitors in competitive market-
places could be expected to provide the missing information. Also, any sub-
stantial disparity between the expectation of the uncommitted purchaser and
the actual costs will present an arbitrage opportunity to third-party aggregators
of information.191 That is especially so with the increasing access to informa-
tion through third-party aggregators, including online search engines and on-
line consumer product reviews. For example, long before the Department of
Transportation required airlines to include fees and taxes in fare advertise-
ments, comparison shopping websites offered that service.192
The profit opportunities for third-party sellers of information may them-
selves represent an inefficient allocation of resources that antitrust policy
should condemn.193 Further, the above critique may overstate the strength of
the competitive response. In oligopoly markets firms may find it profitable to
18 Cf A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. EcoN. 417, 419
(1975) (arguing that the ability to price discriminate is necessary to provide lesser quality to the
average consumer while retaining marginal consumer).
189 In an article on which the Court relied in Kodak, Richard Craswell showed that information
asymmetries can serve as a substitute to market power. See Richard Craswell, Tying Require-
ments in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 661, 671
(1982). Craswell also noted the efficiency loss resulting from this exercise of power. Id. at 672.
190 See id. at 672-73 ("In principle, all of these [aftermarket] costs can be reduced to a single
expected present value, but the calculation often will be a difficult one.").
19' See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Con-
sumer Information, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 491, 501-02 (1981) (discussing the market for information).
192 See, e.g., ORarrz (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.orbitz.com (demonstrating that airfare and
rental car fares are quoted as including taxes and fees).
93 The.information costs, including the expenses associated with information aggregators, rep-
resent an allocative inefficiency caused by the business model of relying on supracompetitive
profits in an aftermarket to subsidize normal profits in the upfront marketplace. An antitrust
policy concerned with economic efficiency should not applaud this result. Also, if the seller has
the best and cheapest information (as is likely) and does not find it competitively advantageous
to disseminate that information to buyers, leaving on the table the profit opportunities from such
dissemination, we can assume the information disseminated by third parties does not cure the
information asymmetry sufficiently to erode profits available to the seller from exploiting the
asymmetry.
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act in parallel in taking advantage of information asymmetries.194 Not all mar-
kets are as readily susceptible to comparison shopping as are markets for air-
line travel, and not all information asymmetries are as easily eliminated by
third-party disclosure as are hidden taxes and fees.'"9 The critique also ignores
the second criterion for the seller's acquiring market power in the aftermarket
by employing a lock-in strategy: the purchasers' inability-under the circum-
stances-to use available information in reaching decisions that maximize
their expected utility.
2. The Behavioralist Justification
According to Bar-Gill, writing about credit card teaser rates:
Even if consumers anticipate lock-in, they still underestimate the cost of
lock-in, since they do not expect to borrow (or to borrow as much) in the
future. Hyperbolic discounting reinforces this revised version of the switch-
ing cost argument. Naive hyperbolic discounters may wrongly anticipate that
they would switch to a new card, but in fact will not switch when the intro-
ductory period ends.'9 6
This is a behavioralist response. It presents an alternative justification for the
result in Kodak that is complementary to, and perhaps more robust than, the
informationist justification.
Empirical study directed to understanding individuals' deviations from util-
ity-maximizing behavior has uncovered a number of decisionmaking heuris-
tics that are relevant to the realities of consumers' decisions in markets with
lock-in effects and aftermarket costs. The phenomenon of hyperbolic dis-
counting, whereby medium- and long-run consequences of a decision are con-
sidered too uncertain to be included in the up-front decision, is the most
readily applicable. Hyperbolic discounting can be blamed for myriad ill-ad-
vised purchase decisions; for example, the phenomenon is well discussed in
the literature on failures in the mortgage lending markets.'9 7 The consumer
' In markets susceptible to oligopoly conduct, competitors will find it profitable to imitate the
strategy of exploiting the information asymmetry. Cf POSNER, REGULATION, supra note 39, at 7
(recognizing that competitors who benefit from the information asymmetry lack incentives to
expose it, citing the example of cigarette markets). An example of this reality is a local market
for rental cars, in which every company hides the charges imposed to cover costs of taxes behind
low nominal rental rates (even when those post-commitment charges were large in relation to the
nominal rental rate). Before third-party websites like Orbitz bundled the costs into the up-front
advertised price, purchasers could form either a hard or a soft commitment to the purchase before
being made aware of the full costs.
9- Continuing with the airfare example, Orbitz or a competitor airline would find it difficult to
bundle into a single salient number matters such as airlines' safety record; seat sizes; quality of
cabin service; baggage fees; and ticket-change fees, among other relevant facets of competition.
196 Bar-Gill, Seduction, supra note 76, at 1407.
19 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 144, at 136. I note above that this might be seen to
present antitrust problems. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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purchaser of an automobile may conduct her or his cost-benefit analysis in
terms of the immediate purchase decision and not in terms of the expected
costs, and expected benefits, five years later.'98 Purchasers of goods on credit
compare immediate up-front gratification against highly discounted costs of
long-term repayment.'99 This effect is readily exploited by savvy sellers who
advertise costs in terms of monthly payments rather than total purchase price.
The anchoring heuristic also has been well discussed in the behavioral eco-
nomics literature.200 Dan Ariely employed the more accessible term "relativ-
ity."201 BY articulating costs in relation to a much larger cost, the smaller costs
become overwhelmed by the larger. Sales of optional equipment or services
on automobiles may succeed due to a seller's framing the decision strategi-
cally; the $1000 cold-weather package or $3000 extended warranty is small in
relation to the $25,000 cost of the automobile. Even at $25 or more, checked-
bag charges at airport ticket counters are small in relation to the ticket price,
and the same goes for insurance charges and the GPS option at the rental car
counter. Other exploitable decisionmaking heuristics include the ownership
bias202 and the optimism bias.2 03 Having made a soft or hard commitment to a
purchase, the value of the item increases in the mind of the purchaser. A
purchaser who is later told there is an additional, undisclosed charge will be
more inclined to pay that charge than one who learns of the charge before
becoming committed to the purchase. 204 And an over-optimistic consumer
might be blind to downstream costs that are statistically likely to occur.
Applying this to Kodak, a purchaser of equipment in the competitive fore-
market reaches a purchase decision on the basis of a competitive advertised
price.205 That purchaser is initially unaware of aftermarket costs. Even if he or
she is made aware of those costs prior to purchase, decisionmaking heuristics
can minimize the impact of that knowledge on the purchase decision. Those
heuristics include hyperbolic discounting of aftermarket costs, anchoring ef-
198 Cf Jason J. Kilbom, Behavioral Economics, Overindebtedness & Comparative Consumer
Bankruptcy: Searching for Causes and Evaluating Solutions, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 22
(2005) (discussing hyperbolic discounting in consumer credit transactions). The long-term cost-
benefit analysis of an automobile purchase is not limited to the obligation to make payments on a
loan, but also includes, for example, value depreciation, insurance expenses, and opportunity
costs
' See id. at 22.
200 See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
201 ARIELY, supra note 66, at 1.
202 See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
204 Cialdini reports of practices including permitting consumers to drive cars before "discover-
ing an error" in the quoted price. The psychologically committed consumer tends to accept the
upwardly revised price. CIALDINI, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 142, at 98-99.
205 Recall that the equipment market in Kodak was competitive. See supra note 184 and accom-
panying text.
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fects with the impact of minimizing the aftermarket costs relative to the up-
front price, ownership bias coming into play after commitment (even before
actual ownership), raising the purchaser's reservation price, and optimism
bias undervaluing the likelihood of aftermarket costs.
Tellingly, Kodak argued to the Court that its marketing strategy was to
make its profit in the parts and services aftermarket rather than in the equip-
ment fore-market.2 06 It was in essence selling the package-machines, parts,
and services-and was doing so largely on credit. And it had deliberately
structured the transaction in a way that maximized the likelihood of purchas-
ers becoming psychologically or actually locked in without full consideration
of the costs of the overall package. This harmed consumers directly; it had the
potential to harm competitors who did not engage in the same sort of conduct;
and it presented concerns for allocative efficiency that properly concerned the
Supreme Court.2 07
3. Antitrust Harms
Hovenkamp recently criticized Kodak on the basis of his study of "Coasean
markets," which, Hovenkamp teaches, are the markets in which individual
buyers and sellers transact business. 208 In the case of Kodak, the Coasean mar-
ket is the relationship between the locked-in purchaser and the seller.
Hovenkamp argues the monopoly power the seller has in a Coasean market,
like the relationship between Kodak and its locked-in purchasers (or a cell
phone customer and service provider) is irrelevant to the question whether the
seller has market power in a properly defined antitrust market. He sees Kodak
as reflecting confusion on the Court's part between the Coasean market and
the antitrust market, sending "antitrust policy off in the wrong direction."2 09
Hovenkamp's critique of Kodak applies both to the informationist justifica-
tion and to the behavioralist justification that I articulate here. Whether the
lock-in occurs because of an information asymmetry or a marketing strategy
that exploits cognitive biases, the harm is still transaction-level harm rather
than market-wide harm. But Hovenkamp's critique is flawed. While one in-
stance of behavioral exploitation will harm only the one purchaser but have a
206 See Eastman Kodak Corp. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 478 (1992).
207 The resource misallocation arises in the overspending on the package due to the actual or
psychological lock-in. But for the marketing practices, competition should have reduced Kodak's
profits on the package to the competitive level. See supra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
208 See Hovenkamp, Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 26, at 626. Because the parties
are forced to bargain with one another, every Coasean market represents a bilateral monopoly.
See id. at 627. Hovenkamp's term is derived from Ronald Coase's description of bargaining
between two parties over a legal entitlement, resulting in an efficient allocation of rights. See R.
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
209 See Hovenkamp, Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 26, at 628.
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de minimis impact on competition generally, a marketing strategy built on
behavioral exploitation threatens market-wide impacts across the aggregate of
individual transactions. The successful exploiter of decisionmaking biases
will be able to gain or maintain market share over a large number of transac-
tions. Where conduct is deceptive, a robust anti-fraud enforcement program at
the federal or state level (or both) can protect against market harm. Partly for
that reason Hovenkamp, at least, does not see deception as an antitrust con-
cern.2 10 That same argument has limited application to behavioral exploitation.
Only a limited consumer protection backstop exists to prevent the inefficient
resource allocation behavioral exploitation causes. 211
It is possible, of course, for Congress to pass new laws, courts to interpret
the laws that do exist, or the Federal Trade Commission to act under its
broader Section 5 power (including its power to challenge both unfair meth-
ods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices), to address prac-
tices that exploit known decisionmaking biases, as the Commission did in its
narrow rule, issued under its "unfair acts" authority, targeting door-to-door
sales.212 But the line between procompetitive advertising and marketing be-
havior and behavioral exploitation is narrow. As has long been recognized in
the case of predatory pricing, outlawing one risks inappropriately chilling the
other.2 13 It is also difficult in the individual case to distinguish harm caused by
behavioral exploitation from simple buyer's remorse occurring without the
fault of the seller. For those reasons, adopting an enforcement scheme target-
ing behavioral exploitation on a transaction-by-transaction basis may be im-
210 See 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 782d (3d ed.
2008).
211 Even where redundant prohibitions exist, the de minimis argument for deference to con-
sumer protection regulation is a curious one. Many antitrust harms are felt in isolated transac-
tions, and relevant economic impacts only exist if enough isolated transactions are aggregated.
For example, a direct purchaser complaining of price fixing complains only of the harm he or she
suffers, but is not required to rely on a fraud claim (which would be difficult to make in any
event, unless omitting to tell a consumer the fact of price fixing is a material omission).
212 See supra notes 81, 167, and accompanying text. The rule created a three-day cooling-off
period during which the purchaser could reconsider the sale.
213 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986); cf JOHN
E. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ADVERTISING AND REGULATION
102-03 (1997) (discussing why "[a]dvertising [b]ans [aire [a]nti-[c]onsumer").
The chilling-effect concern might be mitigated if behavioral exploitation were to be outlawed
by FTC rule or Section 5 enforcement rather than by interpretation of the Sherman or Clayton
Acts, because the FTC Act and rules promulgated under its authority are not enforceable by
private right of action. See Thomas B. Leary, A Suggestion for the Revival of Section 5, ANTi-
TRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2009, at 1, 1-3 (proposing a use of Section 5 in "frontier" cases that are not
easily pursued under the Sherman or Clayton Acts), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
abalpublishinglantitrust source/Feb09 Leary2_26f.authcheckdam.pdf. But see William E.
Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 939 & n.54, 948 & n.84 (2010) (noting that
Section 5 standards may be used to interpret state laws that do allow for private enforcement, and
that Section 5 holdings may serve as precedent in later private litigation).
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possible. But treating behavioral exploitation as an antitrust harm permits
aggregation of the effects and allows enforcement on the basis of market ef-
fects, rather than individual consumer harm that may be difficult to attribute
to overreaching by a merchant seller.
Behavioral exploitation as a theory of antitrust liability relies on proof of
(1) general intent on the part of the merchant seller, and (2) an effect on the
market. In one form, some courts disfavor reliance on intent evidence in anti-
trust enforcement because of the danger of its abuse-serving as evidence of
harm where it does not exist 214-but the showing of general intent I would
require has the effect of limiting, not expanding, enforcement. A merchant
might be held to have had sufficient intent to exploit a particular decisionmak-
ing heuristic if it had studied the heuristic or paid for focus groups to learn the
most effective way to increase consumer response.215 Proof that a merchant
merely offered an array of products-though it might well nonetheless trigger
the same heuristic and cause a market effect 216-would be insufficient to meet
the requirement of proving intent.
Proof of an effect on the market is necessary to prevent overuse of the
theory of behavioral exploitation in consumer, competitor, and government
suits based on antitrust laws.2 17 The behavioral exploitation theory is not novel
in this requirement; a market effect requirement is nearly ubiquitous in anti-
trust, with the narrow exception of conduct held to be illegal per se.218 Such
an effect existed in Kodak, where on remand from the Supreme Court's hold-
ing that a lock-in sufficed to demonstrate market power, a jury concluded that
Kodak did have a monopoly in the parts aftermarket despite the competitive
market for its equipment. 2 19 Proving that the effect flows from the behavioral
exploitation, rather than some other cause, is a more complex problem, but no
more so than the causal demonstration required throughout antitrust litigation
214 See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400-01 (7th Cir.
1989) (citing Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983)
(Breyer, J.)) (discussing variations in how courts have treated evidence of a firm's intent, includ-
ing the Barry Wright treatment).
215 General intent is consistent with other scienter standards in civil antitrust claims. See, e.g.,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945); Ronald A. Cass &
Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 661 (2001). A merchant has this
mental state if it acts deliberately, knowing of the probable consequences of its actions.
216 See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
217 The danger to be avoided includes, for example, the threat of treble damages liability in a
suit by a purchaser suffering buyer's remorse. See Edwards, supra note 116, at 360 ("Could a
consumer who impulsively purchases a candy bar and a copy of a gossip magazine claim that he
has suffered a cognizable injury under the FTC Act?").
218 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (defining the rule of
reason to include examination of "the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable").
219 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.
1997).
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focusing on a defendant's conduct. Private plaintiffs are saddled with a causa-
tion requirement as a matter of the antitrust standing doctrine,22 0 and all plain-
tiffs, including public enforcers, face functionally the same burden under the
rule of reason. 221
D. NEO-CHICAGO AND BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST
Behavioral Antitrust relies on lessons from empirical study of individual
behavior to address theoretical pronouncements of the Chicago School. In
cases like Kodak, the application of Behavioral Antitrust suggests the Post-
Chicago arguments (favoring the Court's holding), rather than those of the
Chicago School approach, more accurately reflect the realities of the market-
place at issue. In other cases Behavioral Antitrust may favor a result the Chi-
cago School would advocate. Perhaps, for example, modem consumer
behavior, including Internet researching and purchasing conduct, renders re-
coupment of losses incurred in predation to be as unlikely as some affiliated
with the Chicago School have argued.2 22 Behavioral Antitrust also offers the
potential for a broader understanding of what conduct might lead to anticom-
petitive effects through a more complete understanding of consumer behavior.
Understanding the role of Behavioral Antitrust this way, it begins to sound
much like a goal espoused by the proponents of Neo-Chicago Antitrust: in-
forming theoretical insights with empirical study. Both disciplines serve the
end of refining antitrust analysis through economic study informed by real-
world facts, including a recognition that facts, or our understanding of them,
have changed in the decades since the 1970s.
III. CONCLUSION
An analysis of Kodak demonstrates how a consumer-targeted Behavioral
Antitrust analysis can provide a fuller understanding of the opportunities for
sellers to bring about harm to competition in markets where simpler economic
models predict competitive harm will not occur. On its surface it is a difficult
task to reconcile the newest economic theory in antitrust, Behavioral Anti-
trust, with Neo-Chicago antitrust. That is particularly so because the Chicago
School, which Neo-Chicago celebrates, gained ascendency in the 1970s while
220 See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (harm must be "by reason of' a violation of the antitrust laws); Palmyra
Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem'l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1299 (1Ith Cir. 2010) (holding
that plaintiffs harm must be of the sort that makes the conduct illegal).
221 See, e.g., Brooke Grp., Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225
(1993) (requiring a showing of a causal connection between conduct and an increase in prices);
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 774-77 (1999) (government enforcement action where
Court required proof that the complained of conduct caused a harmful effect).
222 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 232; BORK, PARADOX, supra note 18, at 149-55; Easter-
brook, Limits, supra note 10, at 27.
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rejecting the information economics of the same decade. It would be unpleas-
antly symmetrical if Neo-Chicago developed while rejecting behavioral eco-
nomics, the cousin of information economics, and its legal application in
Behavioral Antitrust.
But at bottom, Neo-Chicago antitrust and Behavioral Antitrust seek the
same goal. They seek to refine the approach to economically informed anti-
trust, better to ensure that economic theories serve the economic efficiency
and consumer protection goals of antitrust enforcement. No reason exists why
they cannot work together in doing so.
